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BY lEIROS
Pragmatism has iDeen described as an attitude of mind,
as a method of investigation, and as a theory of truth. xls an
attitude it is the attitude of looking forward to outcomes.
From this point of view, it is broad enough to include, in a
sense, both the method and the theory of truth, for in both these
our montsl attitude is that of looking forward to outcomes. As a
method it is the use of outcomes to determine the meanings of
our ideas; and as a theory of truth it is the appe.'oL to outcomes
to e:r[)lain the truth or falsity of our ideas.
Yox the present we may confine ourselves to pragmatism
as a method. The doctrine in this form was proposed in 1878,
but remained entirely unnoticed for tv/enty years. In 1898
Y/illiaui James "discovered" this early statement, and by the aid
of his wonderful literary style gave it the widest currency.
Since that time the word "pragmatism", as he puts it, "fairly
spots the pages of our journals".
The article from which the whole Pragmatic movement
seems to have grov/n was piiblished by 0. 3. Peirce in the Popu-
lar Science I.Ionthly under the title "How to IJake Our Ideas Clear".
This was the second of six papers Linder the general heading "Illus
traticns of the Logic of Science". The first of the articles is
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called"The Fixation of Belief", and serves as a kind of gene3?al
introduction to tlie rest. The later articles of the series are
entitled "The Doctrine of Chances", "The Probability of Induction"
"The Order of ITature", and "Induction, Deduction, and Hyi:othes is "
.
The latter were largely examples and illustrations of scientific
procedure, and as they present more detail than we can take up
at this point, v;e may restrict our attention to the first and
second, and more particularly to the second, tliat on "How To Llake
Our Ideas Clear". The main contentions of this article may be
summarized as follows:
-^y ^ qIG ' r idea is meant, according to tlie logicians,
one wjiich will oe recognized wherever it is met with, so that
no other will he mistaken for it. But since to do this without
ei:ception is im ;ossible to human beings, and since to have such
acquaintance v/lth the idea as to iT'-ve lost all hesitancy in
recognizing it in ordinary ca::es amounts only to a subjective
feeling of mastery v/hich may be entirely mistaken, they supple-
ment the idea of ' clearness ' with that of 'distinctness'. A dis-
tinct idea is defined as one that cont;^ins nothing v/hich is not
clear. By tiie contents of an idea logicians understand what-
ever is contained in its definition, so that an idea is distinct -
ly apprehended, according to them, v/hen we can give a precise
definition of it, in abstract terms. Here the profeL:sional
logicians leave the subject, but it is easy to show that the
doctrine that familiar use and abstrict distinctness make the
perfection of anprehension "has its only true place in philoso-
phies which have long been e xtinct , and it is now time to
II
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formulate a method of attaining "a more perfect clearness of
tho^^ght such as we see and admire in the thinkers of our own
time"
.
The action of thou'-ht is excited hy the irritation of
a douht, and ceases when belief is attained; so that the ;oro-
dnction of belief is the sole fmiction of thou.^iht. As thought
airpeases the irritation of a doubt, Vv'hich is the motive for
thinking, it relaxes and comes to rest for a moment when belief
is reached. But belief is a tule for action, and its applica-
tion requires further thou;^ht and further doubt, so that at the
same time that it is a stopping place it is also a new start-
i.ig place for thour;ht. The final upshot of thinking is the
e::ercise of volition.
"The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit,
and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes
of action to which they -cive rioe. If beliefs do not differ
in this res )CGt, if they appease the same doubt by producing the
sa\ie rrle of action, then no nore differences in the manner of
consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more
than playing a tune in different keys is playing a different
tune •
"
Imaginary distinctions are made very frec-uently, it
is true, between beliefs v;hich differ only in their mode of ex-
pression. Such false distinctions do as much harm as the con-
fusion of beliefs really different. "One singiUar deception of
this sort, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation pro-
du-ced by our o--n uncloarness of thought for a charaolnr oi the
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object we ire thinking. Instead of -perceiving that the obscur-
ity is purely subjective, we fancy that we contemplate a ouality
of the obiect which is essentially mysterious; and if our con-
ception be aftervvards ijresented to us in a Gle:ir form we do not
recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of t]ie feeling
of unintelligibility. . .Another such deception is to mistake a
mere difference in the gramm?itical construction of two words for
a distinction between the ideas they exiireGS ]?rom all these
sophisms v/e shall be perfectly safe so long as we reflect that
the v;holc fmnction of thought is to produce habits of action;
and that v^hatever there is connected v/ith a thought, but irrele-
vant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but no part of it'^
"To develop a meaning we have, therefore, simply to
determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is
simply vrh'-t habits it involves. ITow tho identit" a habit de-
pends on hov: it mifiht lead us to act, no'G .morjiy u...^ox circum-
stances as are likely to arise, but under such as might possi-
bly occur, no matter ho-r im-^robable . . . . Tlius we come c'o-n to what
is tangible and practical as the root of every real distinction
of thou?:ht, no matter hov/ subtile it may be; and there is no
distinction so fine as to consist in ar^^thing but a oossible
difference in practice".
As an example, consider the doctrine of transsu.bstan-
tiation. Are the elements of the sacrament fleshand blood
'only in a tropical sense' or are they literally just that?
TT3^
"v/e have no conception of wine exceiT&\what may enter into a
belief either, 1) that this, that, or trie other is wine, or 2)
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that wine posse'?3GS certain properties, Siioli "beliefs are
nothing Imt self-notifications that we should, upon occasion,
act in regard to such things as v/e helieve to he \7ine according
to the rualities v/hich we believe wine to possess, The occasion
of such 'i.ction would he some sensihle perception, the motive of
io to produce some sensihle result. Thus our action has ex-
clusive reference to what affects our senses, our hahit has the
same bearing as our action, ou.r belief the same as our habit,
our conception the same as our belief; and we can consecuently
msan nothing by wine but what h-s certain effects, direct or
indirect, upon the senses; and to talk of something as having
all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood,
is senseless jargon Our idea of anything is_ our idea of its
censihlG of ects; n.nd if we fancy th-^.t we 'have any other, v^e
deceive ourselves, and mictp.]:o uiore sensation a ccomx^a-i^^ing .the
thought for a part of the thought itself".
"It ap7-)ears, then, that the rule for att--^ ining .. .clear-
ness of apprehension is eis follows: douz IC.--^ r ..' ^-t effects , which
might conceivably have practical bearings , we conceive the object
of our c
o
ne option to hnve . Then . our conception of these effects
is the whole of our c oneeption of the object" . (italics mine)
.
An application of this method to a conception which
v\rticiilarly concerns logic occu.-iif^B the lant section of the
article, a use of the method to c-u.-r o-.r conception of |
"reality". Considering clearness in the sense of familiarity
j
no idea coul : be clearer than this, for everyone uses it with -oer-l
feet confidence. Clearness in the sense o definition is on y I
i
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sliglitl^' more difficult, --"we ma^- defir^e the real a3 that whose
characters are independent of vfhat an^ljody iaay uhink o..em to he".
But however satisfactory this is as a definition, it does not
hy any means ro.^.'^ze oiir idea of reality perfectly clear. "Here,
the--., l*^"^ apply our itiIos. .iccording to them, reality, lil^e
every other (juality, consists in the peculiar sensible effects
w'-^vch f i'^c --^art'-i''-ir. o:c it ^^rodiice. ?he only effect which
real tilings have is to cause belief, for all tlie sensations which
they excite emerge into consciousness in the forjii of beliefs.
The question therefore iG, hov,' i'j true helief for belief in the
roal) distinguished from false belief (belief in fiction)".
Briefly this may be answered by saying that the true belief is
the one which will '-m arrived at after a complete examination of
all the evidence. "fhat Opinion v/hich is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate, is vrhat we mean by the truth,
and the ob;ject represented in this opinioii is the real". Qiote:
"?ate means merely that which is sure to co.me true, and can no-
how be avoided".] The real thus depends indeed upon what is
ultimately thought about it, but not upon what any particular
person thinks about it. This is clearly brou^-ht out in contrast
to non-scientific investigation, where -ersonal equation coimts
for a groat deal more. "It i;: hard to convi!",ce a follower of
the a priori method by adducing facts; but to shov- him that an
opinion that he is defending is inconsistent with what he has
laid dov.Ti elsewhere, and he will be vor^ to retract I'g ,
These minds do not see: to believe that disputation is ever to
cea-'O; they seem to think that tlie opinion which is natural for
J
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ono m^n is not for ar.othGr, "^nd. th'-^.t l^eliof , v/ill consecuently
,
never oo GottlocT, In coiitcntiiig thcniselyoo ./i-th fixing tlieir
own opinions by a method which would lead another man to a dif-
forent result, t'-r*'^ hetrny thoir feehle hold u^^.on the conception
of what trutji is. On the other hnnd, all the followers of
science are fully persuaded tjiat the processes of investigation,
if only pushed far enough, v.-ill give one certain solution to
every ;;uestion to vhich they can "be applied. One man may in-
vestigate the velocity of light "by studying the transits of Yenus
and the aberration o;" f^o stars; another by the opposition of
liars -and eclipses of Jupiter* s satellites; a third by the
meti^od of Fizian They may at first obtain different results,
but, as each
,
^irfects his method and his processes, the results
will move steadily together toward a destined center. 3o with
all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the
nost antagonistic views, but the progres of investigation carries
them by a force outside of themselves to one and the sanie con-
clusion". T]i;l3 conclusion, to be sure, m.ay be long postponed,
and might indeed be orecedod by a false believe v/hich should be
acjoepted universally. But ''the opinion which would finally re-
sult from investigation does not depend on hov; anybody may actu-
ally think... The ro^.lity of that vmich is real does not depend
on the real fact that the investigation is destined to lead, at
last, if continued long enough, to a belief in it".
It vi 11 'be seen that tiiis article does no'o intend to
aut forward any nev/ theory of truth. It is simply an attempt
at expounding a new theory of clearness. Peirce desires to
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desGribe a nevr way of clearing up metaphysical disputes^ the
method, namely, of finding the meaning of each question hy re-
diiGing it to its ex:-eriental consequences.
For Peirce a doctrine could he perfectly clear and yet
false. This would he the case vmere one had a vivid idea of all
the outcomes in exoorlence involved by t he idea, hut yet was un-
ahle to prophesy any outcome that should he verified by future
fact. Our idea of the object wo^^ld not in that case 'correspond
to the reality' in the sense of giving us a belief which could
be "verified by all investigators".
Peirce, then, instead of havi..g a radical and startling
theory of truth to propose, v/ould consider himsjl^f an ultra-
conservative on the uestion of what shall be called truth.
Approaching the matter from the standpoint of a scientist, (for
he says in another connection that he had at this tii'^:e soent most
of his life in a laboratory), he is concerned only with an at-
tempt to apply "the fruitful methods of science" to "the barren
fielfj of metaphysics". For metaphysics seems to him very much
in need of oi^tside help. His different conception of t.he two
disciiplinos may be seen from the following passage. In contrast tjj:
philosophy, he is eulogizing *the natural sciences, "where inves-
tigators, instead of condemning each the work of the others as
misdirected from beginning to end, co-operate, stand upon one
another's shoulders, and multiply incontestible results; where
every ob::ervation is rei^eated, and isolated observations count
|
for little; where every hypothesis that merits attention is
Ii
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subjected to sex'ere 'out fair oxamination, only after the
loredictions to which it leads have been remarkably borne out by
ex'^erience i-^ trusted at all, and then only provisionally; v:here
a radically false step is rarely taken, even the most faulty of
those theories nhich gain credence being true in their main ex-
periental predictions".
It is in a desire to elevate metaphysics to somewhere
near this level that Peirce pro -oses his new theory of clearness,
believing that much of the useless disputation of philosophy, as
he sees it, will end when we knov; exactly what we are talking
about according to t>is test.
On the question of truth he might indeed have roferrod
to another of his early articles, whore the same idea of the in-
dependence of truth from individual opinion is brou'rht out,
The much-q.uotod paper on "How To Hake Our Ideas Clear" w-.s , as
\7Q have noted, the second of a scries c/lled "Illustrat i'onn of
the Logic of Science" • in order to get his doctrine of truth
more adequately before us, we may turn for a moment to the
first article of the series, the paper called "Tlie Fixation of
Belief".
Here Peirce begins by pointing out four methods for
fixing belief. in the first, or'method of tenacity', one sim-
ply picks out the belief which for some reason he desires , and
holds to it by closing his eyes to all evidence pointing the
other way. The second, or the ^method of authority*, is the
same exce ^^t that the individual is replaced by the state. The
third, or 'a priori method', makes a thing true when it is
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'agreeal^le to re?is:)n* . But this sort of truth varies hetv/een
persons, for what is agreeaolo to reason is more or less a matter
of taste.
In contrast vrith these, and especi-rlly -vith the a priori
method, a method must ho disco.vered which v/ill determine trath
entirely apart from individual opinion, Tliis is the method of
science. That is, "To satisfy our douhts . . .it is necessary tlvi
a method should he found hy -.Thich our heliefs may he caused hy
nothing human, hut hy some external permanency -- hy something
upon which our thinking ha^s no effect.... It must he something
which affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these
aj'fections are necessarily as various as are individual condi-
tions, yet the method nust he such that the ultimate conclusion
of every i^^an shall he the same. Such is the method of science.
Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language,
is this: There are real things whorje characters are entirely
independent of our opinions ahout them; those realities affect
our senses accord 'HjO: to regular lavrs, and, though our sensations
are as different as our relations to the oh;iects, yet, hy taking
advantage of the lairs of x^Qrception, we can ascertain hy reasoning
hovj thiii-:'^^s really are, and any man, if ho have sufficient ex^^er-
ience and reason enough ahout it, v'ill he led to one true conclu-
sion. The new conception here involved is' that of reality.
It may ho asked how i know that there are any rea'itios. If
this hypothesis is the sole srr^.port of my method of inquiry, my
method of inquiry must not he use:^. to support my hypothesis.
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The reply is this: 1. if investigation oannot 13 e 'regarded as
iiroving that there are real things, it at least does not lead to
tlie
a contrary conclusion; hiit the method and^ concepti on on Y/hich it
is "based remain ever in harmony. IT'O doubts of the method, there-
fore, arise with its nractice, as is the case -jith all the others.
2. The feeling which gives rise to any method of fizing belief
is a dissatisfaction at tvio repugnant propositions. i3ut here
already is a vague concession that there is some one thing to
-jhich a proposition should confoim. . .ITohody
,
therefore, can
really doubt th-'t there are realities, or, if ho did, doubt v/ould
;ot be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, theriforo,
is ono r;hich every mind admits. 3o th;at the social impulse
does not cause me to doubt it. 3. iUverybody uses the scientific
method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it V7hen
he does not 'movi how to a^Toly it. . 4.- Bxi^erience of the method
"las not led m.e to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific
investigation has had the most vronderful triumphs in the way of
.settling O'dnion. These afford the explanation of my not doubt-
ing the method or the hypothesis which it suoposes • fp.l£)
The method of science, therefore, is procedure based
on the hypothesis th.at there are realities independent of what
-we may think them to be. This, it seems, is what Peirce re-
gards as the fundamental princi'Dle of the ^ logic of science*.
This principle, stated i-^vo in the first paper, is again stated,
as we have seen, towards the close of the second paper. There
he says again, "All the followers of science are fully persuaded

-12-
th^,t the processes of irives tigrat ion, if only iiished far enough,
'.Till give one certain solution to every question to v/hich they
can l^e applied ... .Different minds may set out \iiVn the mo :t an-
t'^.gonistic viev/s, but the progress of investigation carries
themselves "by a force outside of themselves to one and the same
conclusion. . .This great lav; is embodied in the concepition of
truth and reality, 'That opinion r/hich is fated to be ultimate-
ly agreed to by all who investigate, is what v^e mean by truth,
and the object represented in this opinion is the re- 1. This
is t'ne way I v/ould explg-in reality", fp,300)
It is v;ell at this point to call attention to a dis-
tinction. It is to be noticed that in the first paper and in
the latter ^art of the second he is tall-iing of a method for at-
taining truth. But in the body of the second paper he is talk-
ing of a method for attaining clearness* These two should be
kept distinct in our minds. The use of the various methods
•escribed for finding the velocity of light v/ere endeavors to
find the truth, not to make our ideas clear. Clearness and
truth Peirce believes to have no invaria^'le connection. He
sayS' in ending the article on "How To llalre Our Ideas Clear",
"It is certainly important to know hoy to make our ideas clear,
but they may be ever so clear without being true " . (p.302, ital-
ics mine.) There are, then, two methods under consideration:
the scientific method for reaching truth, with its -Tostulate that
there are indeoondent realixies, and the logical method for se-
curing clearness, which as he lias just stated, has no necessary
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j
GOiuiection truth,
How I should like to point out, in criticism, that these
i
t\"0 methods cannot "be used together, or rather that the postulate
;
of tlie * scientific method^ will not endure the test proposed hy
the ^method for clearness'. Tlie scientific method postul^.tes !
a reality ujnaffectod hy our opinions about it. But when we ap - i
oly the method for clearness to this reality it seems to vanish.
The process is this: Pcirce, as we will remember, beginji
his discussion of the real by defining it as "that whose charac-
ters are inde";)endent of what anybody may think them to be".
Then passing on to apply his method for clearness he finds that
"reality, like every other quality, consists in the peculiar
sensible effects A7hichthings partaking of it produce", and adds
thit "the only effects which real things have is to cause be-
lief, for all the sensations which they excite emerge into con-
sciousness in the form of beliefs". Realit is the sum of its
sensible affects, its sensible effects are beliefs, so reality
is a sum of beliefs.
How, reality cannot be the 6um of all beliefs regarding
the real, because reality is defined in another connection as
the object represented by a t rue opinion, and a true opinion is
that V7hich is fated to be agreed to after an iiivest i.^ration is
com^oleto. Reality then can consist only in certain selected
beliefs. But if reality is this set of ult 1^:" toly-adopted
beliefs, what is tru.th itself? For truth hj.s oeen defined as !
the beliefs which will be ultimately adopted.
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In other vrorf'^s, vrhen Peirce applies his raetho-'; for
clearmess to the concept of reality, he reduces reality to truth.
He identifies the tv'o . Then there remains no independent reality
which stands as a check on truth. ^-^^ this V7 -s the postulate
of his method of science.
Since the application of his ovm method for clearness
eii -.inates reality, it looks as though Peirce must ahandon either
this method or the postulato of science. He cannot use oOth
the method for clearness and the postulate of the method of
Goionce
.
^.7e must reraemher that Peir3e '.vas a -oioneer in this
movement . And in making the trn.nsition from the older form cf
tlion.sht, ho occasionally uses a \;oid "both in the old sense ana
in the new. .Such woiild seem to he his difficulty with the
;7ord ' real ity' , which he uses hoth in tke newer sense XA/cCt the
raeti.ol ^'or clearness would show it to /iv'.ve, and in the old or-
thodox sense of something ahsolute. 'Then he says "reality...
consists of the peculiar sensiole ef fects v/hich things part'-^.l-in^
of it produce", he seems to have the two senses of the v/ord in
one sentence. Reality consists in sensible effects, or it is
th.at v/hich is produced somehow "by means of our senses. But,
when things partake of reality, reality exists in advance and
produces these effects. Reality is conceived hoth as the
things produced and as the producer of these things.
A somewhat similar difficulty occurs, as I may point
out again in criticism, in the use of the words 'meaning* and

'beliof ^ . Hero the confusion is causod, not by using a v/ord in
tv/o senses, as in the case of ^reality', hut by using both the
\7ords ^meaning* and 'belief in the same sense. Peiroe defines
both 'meaning' fuul 'belief as a suin of habits, and indicates no
difference between them.
Thus he says of meaning, "There is no distinction of
meaning so f .".ne as to consist in anything but a possible dif-
ference in -practice". (293) "To develop its me.aning, v;e have,
therefore, simply to determine what habits it prodiices, for what
a thing means is simply v/hat habits it involves". (292)
But he says similarly of belief, "Belief involves the
establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for
short, of a habit". "Since belief is a rule for action, it is
a new s^.arting point for thought". "The essence of belief is
tro establi;:hment of a habit, and different beliefs are distin-
guished by the different modes of action to which they give rise".
(291)
.
It io to be seen that instead of defining belief and
meaning in terms of the same thing and- thus identifyi^ig them, we
ougjit sharply to distinguish between then. To have the meaning
of a thing is not ,';.ll the same as to beldve in it. Tluis one may
have clearly in mind the meaning of centaurs or of fairies or of
any of the characters of mythology v/ithout in tho slightest
degree believing in them. defining these things in terms of
soiiSible effects, '"e coul^'' say that r^e ]mo,v their meaning in the
sense that vje understand which sensible effects wo^.ld be involved

if they did. exist. But to have a helief ahout them v^ould mean
that V7e 5?iould e :: 'ect theso sensihlo oifects in oaae v/e enc omit e red
the object thought of. In other words, a oolief involves the
possibility of fiilfillraent or frustration of expectation. To
believe in anything is therefore a distinct step bejrond under-
standing it •
In inserting these theories of reality and of belief
in this discussion of a method for clear apprehension, Teirje
is passing beyond a doctrine of cleamess and involving himself
in a doctrine of truth. T7e have seen that he does not seem
to be able to maintain the postulated reality underlying his
description of tlie scientific method for attaining truth. .Uid
it now seeras tlvt he is in equal difficulty with belief. If
meaning is simply a sura of habits , , belief io iiot simxjl^, • oiim of
habits, for the two are not the same. And if, as we have said,
the quality that distinroiishes belief from meaning in the fact
tliat it involves expectati.!- , -e appear to be ^^--r-je
of a new theory of truth, ^ a theory saying that truth is simply
t>:e fulfillment of the-^e e:: -ectations
3ii.ch, we .../ou, i^ LIlu interpretation that Dewey
puts upon the pr Ic method, - s^ich is the theory of truth that
he fincis involved in it.
Tlie interpretations of pragmatism which came parti-
cularly to the notice of Peirce, hov/ever, -were those made by
James a^.d Schiller, and against these, we may say here, he made
vii^'oroiio protest. These he regar^cu ;^..orversions of his

dootrino. aid lio ./j.o 30 iLeairons of indicating that his ovm.
theory of clearness involved for himself no siich developments
as these, that, in order to ---'-c the distinctions clear, he re-
named his OT/n doctrine.
His first article of dissent, appearing in The lloniat
in 1905, T7:'-s directed mainly, however, againr3t the looseness of
]popular U3j,,;e, He traces oriefly tne doctrine '3 ^:ro-.7t]i, Re-
ferring back to his original statement in 1878, he says of him-
self that he "fr.-rned the t' eory th'it a conception
.
th'r^t is, the
rational piirj.;030 of a v;ord or other e:: ression, lies eiiclu^ivoly
in its conceivahle bearing upon the oondnct of life; so that,
since obvionsly nothinn- tfi'-?.t mi^:ht not result from experiment
can have any direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define
d!t5urately all the conceivably experimental phenomena which the
affirmation or denial of :.i concept co^'ld imply, onn "111 have
therein a completa definition of the concept, and 01. ere is abso -
lutely nothing: more in rt. Tot th.is doctrine he CPeirce now
sneakin- of hir-self} invented the name of pra^'-mat ism. . . .His
word 'pragmatism' has gained general recognition in a generalized
sense that seems to argue power of growth and vitality. The
famedfcsycholo^ist
,
James, fir-rit tno': it up, seein.^ th-it his
'radical empiricism' substanti -ily ans\;ored to the rioor's de-
finition, albeit with a certain difference in point of view.
Fexi; the admirably clear au'-"' brilliant thinlrer, I.Tr. Ferdinand
0. 3. 3ch.illor, casting abouc for a ..icre attractive name for
the 'anthropomorphism' of his Riddle of the Sphinx , lit, in
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thit aost remarlralDle paper of his on ilsioms as Postulat es , uvon
the designition 'pragmatism* , vmich in its original sense v;as
in generic agreement with his oxm doctrine, for .rhich he has
since foimd the more av,propri-^.te specification "humanism*, vrtiile
he still retains pragmatism in a somevvhat wider sense, 3o far
all v/ent happily. But at present the word begins to "be met
:7ith occ.-isionally in the literary journals, -where it gets abus-
ed in the merciless way that words have to eirpect V7hen they fall
into literary clutches, Sometimes the manners of the British
have effloresced in scolding at the v/ord as ill-chosen -- ill-
chosen, thai "is, to ex]oress some meaning that it --as rather
designed to exclude, 3o, then, the writer, finding' his "bant-
ling "pragmatism* so promoted, feels that it is time to kiss his
child good-hy and relinquish it to its higher destiny; while to
serve the precise purpose of ex-oressing the original definition,
he begs to annoinice the birth of the vrord "pragmatism*, which
is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers". (pp. 165-6).
Three years later Peirce published an article of
much more outs~;ioken protest, this ti^e' including in his repudia-
tion the professional philosophers as -jell as the popularists.
Writing for the Hibbert Journal (v. 7) he states his case as
follo\7s:
'*Aboi::t forty years ago my studies of Kant, Berkeley,
and others led me, after convincing myself that all thinking
is performed in signs, and that mediation takes the form of dia-
logue, so that it is proper to speak of the ''meaning* of a concept
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to corjclude that to acquire full mastery of that meaning it is
reciiisite, in the first place, to learn to recognize that con-
ce-ot under every disguise, through extensive familiarity with
instances of it. But this, after all, does not imply an- true
understanding of it; so that it is further requisite th^t ,;o
should raalre an abstract logical analysis of it into its ulti-
mate elements, or as completG an analysis as \7e can com.pass.
But even so, "-e may still he without any living co'.iprehension of
it; and the only \7ay to complete our knowledge of its natu.re is
to discover and recognize just what haoits of conduct a "belief
i-;i the truth of the concept (of any concoivahle suhiect, and
u.-ider any conceivahle circumstances) v/o-ld reasonahly develop;
that is to say, v/hat hah its would ultimately result from a suf-
ficioi-t consideration of such truth. It is necessary to imder-
stand the vjord ' conduct *, here , in the hroadest sense. If, for
example, the predication of a given concept v/ere to lead to our
admitting that a given form of reasoning concerning the suhj'ect
of v'hich it ".vas affirmed was valid, when it would not otherwise
he valid, the recognition of that effect in our reasoning would
decidedly he a hahit of conduct", (p. 108).
his
After referring to^own ex-ositions he continues, "...
liv.t in lf?97 Profe::'Sor james roTnoclelled the matter, and trans-
Tnorgrified it into a doctrine of philoso;ohy, so.:.ie ;)art3 of \/hioh
I highly approved, while other and more prominent parts I re-
garc'od, and still regard, as q^pposed to sound logic. /Ibout
the same time Professor rapirie discovered, to the delight of the

Prac^mcj.tist school, that this doctrine was inca-oable of defini-
tion, which would certainly seem to distinguish it from evory
other doctrine in v/hatever branch of science, I was coming to the
conclusion that my poor little maxim should he called "by anotlier
n?jne; and i accordingly, in 4pril 1905, renamed it Pragmaticism.
"
(p. 109) .
"My original essay, having "been written for a popular
monthly, assumes, for no better reaaun onan that real inquiry
cannot hegin until a state of rea,! doubt arises, and ends as soon
aw a- ^^iix b^.^xQT xs attained, that a '^settlement of belief", oi-
in other words, a state of satisfaction
,
is all tliat Truth, or
the aim of inquiry, consists in. The reason I gave for this was
so flimsy, v:hilo the inference was so nearly the gist of _ rag-
raatioism, that I must confess the argument of that essay might
be said with some justice to beg the question. The firct part
of the essay is occupied, however, with shov/ing tii^t, if Truth
consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any actual satisfaction,
but must be the satisfaction that would ultimately be found if
the inquiry v/ere imshed to its ultimate and indefeasible i^suo.
This, I bog to point out, is a very different position from that
of I.'r. ocbiller anri the pragmatists of to-day Tlieir avowed-
ly undei'inable oc^ioion, if it bo not capable of logic-il cliar-
acterization, seems to me to be characterized by an angry hatred
of strict logic, and even a dis osition to rate any exact
thought which interferes with their doctrine as all humbug. At
the same time it seems to m,^ clear that their approximate accep-
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: mce of the Pragmatic is tic principle, and even that very cast-
ing aside of difficult distinctions (although I cannot approve
of it), has helped them to a mightily clear discernment of some
fundamental truths that other philoso""hers have seen hut through
a mist, or most of them not at all. /imong suc]i truths, — all
of them old, of course, yet acloiowledged "by few -- I reckon their
denial of necessitarianism; their rejection of any^ consciousness *
different from a visceral or other external sensation; the'.r ac-
knov^ledgment that there are, in Pragraatistical sense .Real
hahits,..and their insistence upon " ntorpreting all hypostatic
ahstractions in teims of what they v/ould or might (not actual ly
will ) come to in the concrete. It seems to me a pity th-t they
should allow a philoso-~'hy so instinct -.'ith life to hecome in-
fected with seeds of death in such notions as that of the unreali-
ty of all ideas of infinity and that of the mutahility of tnith ,
and in such confusions of thought as that of '-.ctivo willing
fwillin^^ to control thought, to douht , and to weigh reasons)
with willing not to exert the ^vill (willing to helieve)," (pp 111,
112).
These protests against the interpretation of Peirce's
doctrine hy James were to a considerahle degree justified.
James introduces t'-o f^^c' or of value as a criterion for mean-
ing and for truth, while for Peirce these elements did not
enter tlie question at all. J'or James the Yklue of a helief is
an apparent evidence for its truth, v.-hile for Peirce value had
no "olace here. For an account of this development of the prag-
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mitic doctrine v/e pass on now to a discussion of James.

OHAPTI^H II
-TI3M BY
James first uses the term * pragmatism as Pciroe had
done, to refer to a method for attaining Glo.irncss» "].-0]j, in
1898, ho i,)ron'-^^t ^-air ho fore the ••i^hiic j original -^.rt'.-jlo
hy Peirce, he \v..„,u simply expounding ohe Peircian doctrine v/ithout
making smy attempt to pass heyoncl it, But, as we have juct seen,
truth, v/ith \;hioh its originator could not agree. In tliis chap-
ter we may, therefore, look first at his exposition of the doctrinii
of clearness, after that, in order to imderst 'v" James' de-
velOToment of t]ie doctrine into a theory of truth, .ve may turn
"back for a moment to some of his previous puhlications on the
question of truth. It --/ill t';.en "be possible to tr^ce chrono-
logically his developing attitude toward the truth controversy.
From this we may pass finally to an indication ~f some of the
difficiTlties in which he "becomes involved, 'T'hc ":io-t im^portant
of the30, it mcy ho said again, is that he construes the test of
truth of an idea to he, not merely that the idea leads to expect-
ed consequences, hut th it leads to predominantly desi-ab6t con-
he later construction, - ^ ":terpretation as a theory of
sequences
•
The outcomes w]iiGh stand as evidence for truth are
then not merely outcomes bringing fulfilled expectations "but
outcomes brinf^lng haxjpiness.
Jam.es' I^nosition of Peirc e
James at this time explains the pragmatic principle
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"s a raothod of investigating nliilosophic controversies, reducing
:.orn to essentials (clear meanings), and selecting tho.;e v/orthy
of discussion,-^ "Suppose", he says, "that there are tv-o differ-
ent T)hilosophical definitions, or propositions, or maxims, or
what not, v/hich seem to contradict each other, and about -Aiioh
men dismite. If, "by assuming the truth of the one, you can
foresee no practical conseouence to anybody, at any time or plice,
v;hich is different from v/hat you 'would foresee if you assumed
tiie truth of the other, why then the difference hetv/een t he two
propositions is no real difference — it is only a specious and
verhal difference, unworthy of future contention, ...Kiere can
"be no difference v/hich does not malie a difference -- no dif-
ference in the ahstr:ict trr'th which does not oxr^ress itself in
a difference of concrete fact, and of conduct conceuuent upon
that fact, imposed upon somebody, somehow, somev/here, and 33 me-
when..,The v.hole fimction of philosophy ought to he to find
out what definite difference it would make to you uid me, at
definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or th-,t
world-formula he the one \7hich is tiaie"# {0,6 75)
This doctrine is illustrated hy using it to secure the
essence of two philosophico.l ouestions, materialism vs. theism
and the one vs. the many. If we suopone for an instant, he sug-
gests, that this moment is the last moment of the universe's
existence, there \7ill he no difference between materialism and
theism. ill the effects th-'t miecht be ascribed to either have
come about*
1 "The Pragmatic Llethod" .University of California Chronicle 1890.
Rc-orinted in Journal of Thiloso- -hy , 1904 ,vl
,p 675.... 4?^gg ^ 1-423; gr^n^ g
^

"These facts are in, arc TDagged, are captured; and the good'
that ^3 in tliom is :q:ainGd, he the atom or he the Co'^ t'-Gir cause,"
(677) "1".::;G God, if there, has heen doiiis just what the atone could
i
do -- appearing in t he characterof atoms, so to speak, and earn-
ing such .^Tatitucle as is duo to atoms, and no more". Future
;
good or ill is ruled out hy postulate. Taken thus retrospec-
tively, tliere could he no difference het'veen materialism and theisri.
But taken prospectively, tliey point to v/hoily differ-
ent Gonseciuences . "For, according to the theory of mechanical
evolution, the laws of redistrihution of matter and motion,
though they are certainly to thanli for all the good hours which
our organisms have ever y^lded us -and all the ideals which
our minds now fr^ime, are j^et fatally certain to undo their work
again, to redissolve everytliing that they have evolved....
7e make com-olaint of fmaterialismj for what it is not -- not a
permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a fulfiller
of orr remotest hopes ... .Materialism means sim-ly the denial that
the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate
hopes; theism means the affirmation- of an eternal moral order
and the letting loose of hope, 'jurely here is an issue gen-
uine enough for anyone v/ho feels it
"[AndD if there he a God, it is not likely that he is
cgnfined solely to making differences in the vjorld's latter end;
he prohahly makes differences all along its course. IJow the
principle of practicalism says that that very meaning of the con- \
GO t ion of 'iod lies in t" differences -which must he made in :
ex:perience if the conception he true. (rod's famous inventory of

—
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pGrfeotions, as ela'boratn^'' dogmatic thoology, either meaiia
nothing, says our principle, or it implies certain definite things
that we can feel and do at certain definite momenta -""r
lives, thi^ip-s th--^t -e corJ'-''. :iot foel and sho-'-'l'-'' r^o-^r "c ^jere no
God profjont and v;ere the huciness of the univcr^je oarried on "by
laterial atoms instead. So far as our conceptions of the Deit;,
.:;^'-clvo no such ex' oriences
,
they arc meaningless and verhal,
scholastic entities and abstractions, j the positivists say,
and fit objects for their scorn. But so far as they clo involve
such definite experiences, ixod. means something for us, "u^
r^al". (678-680)
The second illustration of the pragmatic princix)lc --
the supposed opposition between t^o orn -^--^fi the many -- ma;^' be
treated more briefly* James suggests certain definite and
X^ractical sets of results in which to define 'oneness \ and tries
out the conception to see whether this result or that is ^That
oneness means. He finds this method to clarify the difficulty
;.3 well here as in the previous case. In summarizing he says:
'I have little doubt myself that this old q_uarrel mi"'^-' be com-
pletely smoothed out to the satisfaction of all claim^ants, if
only t^^c maxim of Poirce were methodically followed here. The
current monism Ox; whc.: hole still keep.j -v^L^An-j iii 'i/ jo ^.j,^ o"o
a way. It says that the world mu.st either be pure disconnected-
ness, no universe ^,t all, or absolrte miity. It insists th.at
-;.: oro xu. uu^'piii^-p- ,xx-..-,.^ . .^..j co.L..octio- v;'-atever,
says this monism, is only possible if theie be still more connec-

tion, until -t 1 • a : ;.re driven to p. dm it the absoliitel^^ tot'l
GOiiiioc uioii rociiiireil, lut this aosolutely total coimGct loxi
either means nothing, is ' the mere word *one^ spelt long, or
else it "'.e-'-in t>'-^ ^.vm O"" i ll f> o v-rtini connections that can
•ossihly he aonceived. I joiieve tlir'.t v-hen we thus attack the
question, and set ourselves to search for these possihle connec-
tions, 'Uid conceive e-ich in a definite and practical way, the
dispute is already in a fair way to he settled hoyond the chance
of misunderstanding, hy a compromise in v/hich the Llany and the One
hoth get their lawf-1 ri-hts". (685^
In concluding, Jarnes relates Peirce to the English
Smpiricists, asserting that it was they "who first introduced tlie
cv-^tr-- 0-^ iT-'to r-retinp- t^'O me...^ " conceptions hy -hat
diii'erences tiioy make for life • . . /j^iie great iilngli " i' in-
vestigating a conception is to ask yourself right off, 'IVhat is
it known as? In t facts does it result? Wliat ts cash-
v:iL ue in terns of particular experience? And v/hao upeoial dif-
ference would come into the v/orld according as it were true or
false?'' T'Mie '-loos locke treat t '-o conco -'tion of -lersD nal iden-
tity. What you raean hy it is jast your chi^n of memories,
says he.. ,30 Berkeley with his 'matter' . The cash-vHue of
matter is just our physical sensations. .. .Hume does the same
thing with causation • It is imown as hahitual antecedence...
3tewart and Brov.-n, James Hill, John Hill, and Bain, have fol-
lowed more or less consistently t'-;-^ same method; -I'-^d llr. d-c rth
Hodgson has used it almost as ex '-lioitly as . ixco . . . .xhe
short-comings and negatinns and the haldnesses of the I'lnglish
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pMlosoi^liors in qinestion come, not from tiioir eye to merd. y
practico-l reeiilts, "but solely from their failure to track t1;he
practical results oorapletoly enough to see ho^ far they extend'^
(685-6)
It v/ill 1)0 at once observed that James, as r-ell as
Peiroe, is at thiu ooint saying nothing ahout a n^v/ doctrine of
truth, hut iG concerning himself only with a new doctrine of
clearness. Meaning and clearness of meanings are his only
tOijics in this paper. Thus he states, "The only meai ing of the
conce ")tion of God lies in the differances which must he made in
experience if_ the conce-^-^tion he true. God's famous inventory
of perfections ... .either means nothing, says our princi'ple, or
it implies certain definite things that we can feel and clo at
certain definite moments in our lives". And again in B-'-'oakin:;:
of the pluralism-monism controversy, "Ai'.y connection v/liatever,
says this monism, is only possihlellf there he still more cornriec-
tion, unti.l zit last we are driven to admit the ahsolutcly total
connection required. But this absolutely total corni) ction
either means nothing, is the mere v,'Ord 'one* spelt long, oi else
it monns the sun of all the partiiil connections...."
3u.t as we all know, Ja.acs did afterwa.jrd emhrace the
new pragmatic theory of truth. Tsliile he did not in 1898 u.se ih e
v.-ord pragmatism to designate anything except a new method for
securing clearness, yet it ca:fl"*lDe shown th -t he had dev^ped
another line of thought, since a much earlier date, which did

lead Quite directly tov/ard the i..ragmatic theory of trnth. It
may be well at this pointy then, to go hack aiid trace the grov/th
of this idea of txiT'^!' t'-^rop/^-h such TTritiiig as he hp,d done hefore
this time. It will oe i'ouric , I think, that James' v/hole philo-
soi^hic tendency to move away from the transcendental and unitary
tovn.rd the particul-ir vrao influencing him tovj-^.rd t'lis nev/ con-
ception •
Development of tlie Doctrine through the Earlier
~" TTfiTTng-s of James
T?ie first article Jaines wr:;tc oix truth, as he later
states,''" was entitled '^The I'unction of Cognition", and was
uhlished in Mind in 1885, Go rn-o- :t ing on this article in 1909
he states that many of tl^o essential theses of the "book "Pragma-
tism", published tv/enty-tv/o years later, vyere already to he
2
found here, -'-v' V -it the difference is mainly one of emphasa. s
.
Ttis article attempts to give a description of linowiiig-
n.s it actually occurs, -- not how it originated nor hav it is a.:-
tecedently posslhle. The thesis is that an idea Imows an ex-
ternal reality when it points to it, rescmhles it, and is co 1b to
affect it. 5!he plan of exr^osition is to start with the sira-
•lest imaginahle material and then gradually introduce additional
matter as it ir: needed imtil v/e have cognition as it actually
occurs. Ja:-es postulates a single, momentarily-existing,
floating feeling -v- the entire content, it the instant, (£ the
1 "The Meaning of Truth", Preface, p.viii.
2 'janie, p. 137.
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"universe.
,
lYliat, thoii, o:>:a this nomentary fGelin,3: know? Call-
\ng it a * feeling of , it cau be airAe any particular feeling
(fragrance, pain, hardness) that the reader likes, '7e see, first
that the feeling cannot properly "be said to kno-.? itself. There
is no inner duality of the knov/er on the one hand and content
or knov/n on the other. "If the content of the feeling occurs
nowhere else in th'e universe outside of the feelii g- itself, and
perish with the feeling, common usage refuses to call it a reali-
ty, and "brands it as a subjective featiire of the feeling's
constitution, or at most as the feeling's dreani. For the feel-
iiig to he cognitive in the so.eci;fiG sense, tken, it must "be self-
transcendent", vlnd 7'e must therefore "create a reality out-
side of it to correspond"' to the intrinsic quality _a". Tliis can
stand as the first complication of that universe. Agreeing
that the feeling cannot he said to know itself, under what condi-
tions does it know the external reality? Janies replies, "If the
newly-created reality resemble the feeling's quality I say
that the feeling may be held by us to be cognizant of that reali -
ty" . It may be objected that a momentary/- feeling cannot proper-
ly kno\T a thing because it has no time to become aware of any of
the relations of the thing. But this rules out only one of the
linds of Imowledge, namely "knowledge about" the thing; Imow-
ledge as direct acquaintance remains. T7e may than assert that
"if there be in the universe a other than the q in the feeling
the latter may have acquaintance with an entity elective to it-
self; an acquaintance moreover, which, as mere acquaintance, it

v;ould. tre hard to l^n'^/^iriG sii.'^Gept i^ble eitlier of iraT)rovement or
increase, iDeing in its v/ay corapleto; n.nd which v/ould oblige us
(So long as we refuse not to call acquaintance knowledge) to say
not only that the feeling is cognitive, hut th-it all qualities
of feeling , so 1 onf.^ as there is anything outside of then which
they resemhle . are feeliiigs of qualities of existence, -nd per-
ceptions of outward fact". But this woul- '-'-^ true, as imexcep-
tionaljrulG, only in our artificially siraplified universe. ii
there wore a numher of different q '
s
for the feeling to resemhle
,
\7hile it meant only one of them, there would ohviously he some-
thing more than res emhlarce in the case of the one v/hich it cHd
knov:. This fact, that resemblance is not enough in itself to
constitute knowledge, can '-^e seen I'-o frori renemhering th'^.t many
feelings which do resemhle each other closely, e.g., toothaches
--do not on that acount Imow each other. Keally to know a
thing, a feeling must not only recomhle the thing, hut muGt ..Iso
he ahle to act on it. In hrief, "the feeling of knov/s -.vhat-
ever reality it resembles, and either directly or indirectly op-
erates on. If it resemhle without -o-.nra^-.iu~ , it is a dream;
if it operates v/ithout resembling, it is .-ai error". Such is
the formula for perceptual knowledge. Concepts must be reduc-
ed to perceots, after which the same r^^le ^-^olds. We ma- s^.y,
to make the formula comr^lete, "1 percept knows whatever rGa...it^-
it directly or indirectly o-oerates on and resembles; a conce-tual
feeling, or thouj::: 1. , knowG -'ity, whenever it actually or
-ootentially terminates in a percept that Ouiis.^^^^ ^n , or resembleL;

that reality, or is othenTise connected ^;7ith it or v/ith its
context
"The latter percept Cthe one to which the concexjt has
"been reduced.]} may he either sensation or sensorial idea; and when
I sa^ the thou.f^ht must ter'-ginate in ovoh a percept, I meai;! that
it must ultimately he ca^-ahle of leading up thereto, -- hy way
of practical ex' erience if the tominal feeling "be a sensation;
hy way of logical or hahitual suggestion, if it he only an image
in the mind"» "These percepts, these termini , these sensihle
things, thes.; mere matters of acrpiaintance , are the only reali-
tiosjvve ever directly know, and tlio vrholo history of our thought is
the his tory of our suhstitution of one of them for the other, and
the reduction'! of thf> suhstitute to tho status of a conce-^tual
sign. Oon^L, juiiiod ihv j he hv ^o..io thinkers, these jc.-.;a-
tions are the mother-earth, the anchorage, the stahle rock, the
fir-'t '-'nd last limits, the terminus a quo ^vnd the terminus ad
c/Liorn o:"^ the mind. ' :'."ind such sensatioiial tcr..iini sho' l
^
out aim with all our higher thought. '|hey end discussion; they
destroy the false conceit of Imowledge ; and without them we are
all t sea v/ith each other's meanings 7e C'n never he sure
we u derstand eachjDther till we are ahle to hring the matter to
this tost. This is why metaphysical discussions are so much
like fighting \7ith air; they have no -Tract ic-1 1 sue of a
sensational kind. Scientific theories, on the other hand, always
terminate in definite percG'^ts. You can deduce a possihle
sensation from your theory and, taking me into your lahorator
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prove that your theory is true of 11177 '^''orld 'oy giviiog rae the sensa-
tion then and there".
At this point James quotes, in suhstantiation, t'-n
following pa3sa;i:e from leirje's article of 1B78: "There i^ no
distinction in meaning so fine as to consist in anything hnt a
'lossi.hle difference in pract ice . . • It appears, then, that the
ml for attaining the highest grade of clearness of apprehension
is as follov's: Consider what effects, which- might conceivahly
have pr-.ictical hearings, \7e conceive the ohject nf nvr conception
to have. Then our conception of these effects- is the whole
of our conception of the object."
In this article are to he found foreshadowings of xDragma-
tism "both as a method and as a theory of truth, Tragmatism
\3 a methof' is s-hown in the whole discussion of the orimacy of
sensations and of the necessity for reducing conceptions to per-
ceptions.. This is exactly in line with the pragmatism proposed
hy Peirce in 1878 -^nd here quoted from hy James. Pragmatism as
a theory of truth is anticipated hy the proposal that the idea
knows, !^nd k:iov7s truly, the rerality v;hich it is ahle to make
changes in. The idea proves its reference to a given reality
hy making these s^^ecified changes. It is ritocedently true
only if it can hring ah out these changes* Tiie next step is to
say that its truth consists in its ability to forecast and hring
to T)e.32 these c^'^T-ns. Then we ha-'/e pragmatism as a theory of
tiuth. James did not take this step, as we shall see, imtil
after 1904. '
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Tiiere is also a siT^-^estion of the ^suId jeotivity' of
JaT.es' later theory of truth, -miioh would differentiate him even
at tills time from Peirce on the question of truth. He has
said that truth must indeed resenihle reality, "but v/ho , he aslis
,
is to determine v/liat is real? He ajiswers that an idea is true
Y/hen it resemhles g-omething which I, as critic , think to "be reality .
"Tnen Qtra onquireiH finds that the feeling that he is studying
contem'ilates v/hat he himself regards as a reality he must of course
admit the feeling itself to be truly cognitive". Peirae would
say that the idea is not true unless it points to a reality
that would he found by all investi.;5ator3
,
'.uite irrespective of
what the one 'erson acting as critic may think. James and
Poirce would therefore, "begin to diverge even at this early date
on tho tnith question. As to what constitutes clearness, they arsi
in agreement.
Somethinf o-" tl^'-^ same idea is stated again four years
later in an article v/hich appeared in Mind and which was repuh-
lished the following year as a chanter of the Principles of
Psychology. One passage will s 'how ' the general trend; "A con-
ception to prevail, ifiust terminate in a world of orderly exper-
i9"ce. A rare phenomenon, to displac'e frequent ones, mutt ho-
ong -.vith others more frequent still. The history of science
is strewn with wrecks and ruins of theory -- essenc-iS and prin-
ci^^lGS, fluids and -.''orces — once fondly clung to, but found to
hang together v/ith no facts of sense. ''I'he exceptionsl phenome-
na solicit our belief in vain until such time as we chance to j

conceive of thein as of kinds already admitted to exist, 'Jr.at
.science means by 'verification' is no more than this, that no
object of conception shall ho "believed v/hich sooner or later
ar.d vivid
has not s o':ie . permanent o"b iect of sensation for its term .
«
,'1en-
sihlo vividness or i)ungency is then the vital factor in reality
when once the conflict hetv/een objects, and the connecting of
tl^em to-et/^cr in the mind, has begun. (II': 301 Italicn mine).
And in another connection he ezioresses the idea as
follows: "Conceptual systems which neither began nor left off
in sensations world be like bridq-es without piers. Systems
about fact muct plunge t .emselves into sensations as bridges
plunge themselves into tlie rock. Sensations are the stable
rock, the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern of thought.
?o find such ternini is our aim with aL 1 our theories --to
conceive first when and where a certain sensation m-.y be had and
then to iiave it. Finding it sto^^3 "'iscussion. Failure to find
it kills the false conceit of knowledge. Only Then you de-
duce a po^:sible sensation for me from your theory, and give it
to me -.-'^o^-i i.ncl whore the theory re(>u"'res, do i begin to be sure
that your thought has anything to do with truth. (II:7j
In 1902 James inserted in the "Dictionary of Philoso-
-^h" -nd .Psychology'' published by J. Hark Baldwin the following
definition for Pragmatism.
"The doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a concoptior
expresses itself in practical conse uences, consecuences either
in the shane of coiidrict to be recommendod, or in tha'^' -^x ezq^eT-

ience to "be e-'-'ected, if the cor:Gex:)tio:i "he tnie; ivliich cc-'.to-
quences \70iild oe different if it were untrue, and muat lie differ
ent from tVe con'sequences by which the meaning of other concep-
tion is ir. -'-^-Tzi expressed. If a second conoc-t ion shorl'' not
appear to havo other consequences, then it uiust reall^,^ ""uo only
the first conce-otion under a different name. In methodology
it is certain that to trace and comTvare their respective conse-
que-ices is an ad-^'" ''le way of establishing the different mean-
ings of different conceptions".
It "^ill be seen tliat Ja'-.ies has not in 1902 diffcreniia
ed between pragmatism as a method and as a theory of truth,
'eavihg out the one reference to truth, the definition is an
excellent statement of the Peircian doctrine of clearness.
This is especially to be noticed in t':e last two sentences, whic
\Te perfectly 'orthodox* statei of method alone.
In 1904 ;.iid 1905 James published two -'•"ers in l^ind
on the trtith question. ^"he first , "Humanism and Truth" may be
called his 'border-line* article. In this he is attempting to
'.^.^0 a 33^n-^athetic inter -^^retation o--" the humanistic theor?/ of
truth -- /-'Tich he later said is e-,actly like his own — but is
~<till making the interpretation as &.n outsider. In the second
-.rticle he ^ of i' , itnly embrnoo-''' the humanistic theory and is
defending it.
The first article begins as • follows "Becciving from
t' . 'ditor '"--'r^ p-^.-,-.r;"r> TO of Mr. Bradley's article fo
-
1 ?.Tind, TT.'^.l?,p.457.

jTily on '^ruth and Practice', I iinde: ' t^^in as a hint to me
.
Jo 1: '. tho controversy over 'Pra ' . ..j.j;....
ave serior.sly begiui. As ray name has been coupled vTitli the
ovement, I deo"!^. it-":ise to ta^^e the hint, the more oo as in
30L10 y_iLarooro. grc.'.toi ciO'^Llt been g.L.V'jii i^io ohan i L..CoJxve,
and probahly undeserved discreel it in other quarters falls also
to my lot.
"Pirst, as 'c- v/ord '^jxci^matism* • I mysel :
orly :ised the terw to indicate a method of carrying on abstract
discission. The serious meaning of a conce;;>t, says r.r. Peirce,
lies in tne concrete difference to somejone v/hioh i'uo join^' true
\7ill malce . .Strive to bring all deb )Stions to that *prag
"latic* toGt, and you :7ill o.cc-oq vain "Tangling: if it can make
no practical difference .tMcL of tv/o wu.i i-ements be true, then
!hey are really one statement in t?/o verbal forms; if it can
aire no ''-- ot' ^ •-^•'c'c vj^.-^-c'' 'ivo^T Gtatement be true
or fal;.c, . ...wo. " ... In neither
case is tl^ere anything fit to 'q[uarrel about: we may save our
breatli
,
a'-'d p;"'n to '^^o:-g im-)Orta:r:.
"All th .10 oj-c pragmatic me olio d implies , ol.uxi, i~i w...ao
truths should have practical consequences. In England the word
-^s been used more broadly, to cover the notion that the ti
ox any statement consists in the conse ..uu.iCcjS , a^i^i ^-..^rticularly
their being good conseqnences . Hera v;g : ot beyond affairs of
lethod altogether; and since tMs irx\aTmatism -and this wider
.ragmatism are so differ-:t, rtant enough to

Have different names, I think that Mr. •^cliiller'a proposal to
call f-o voider pragmatism " o na^.ie of 'ITuma-'-^.T sm' is e-::;el-
lont ought to he adopted. '^he iiarro,;or j^ra^uj, ui^iii niair
still he spoken of as the 'pragmatic method'.
"if farther egotism he in ordci^, t m'T-/ say that the
.iGGOunt of truth given hy Messrs. Sturt u,-...- .Giiiller and hy Pro-
fessor Dev/ey and his school ... .goos heyond any theorising which
I personally had ever indulged in imtil I read their waitings.
.ifter reading these, !_ feel almost sure that these authors are
right in their main contentions , hut the originality is v/holly
theirs, ':'nd I can hardly recognize in m^^ own humhle doctrine
that concepts are teleological instruments anything considerahle
enough to warrant my heing called, as I have heen, the 'father'
of 30 im^Tortant a movement for.vard in philosophy". (Italic mine)
"I think f-^^t a decidef"^ e-^fort at a sjionpathetic mental
;lay v/ith humauisiu is the provioi n.-i attitude to he recommend.od
to tlio roaaer.
"TThen _I find myself playing sympathetically vrith hu-
manism , sonethin'? like w'^at follov/s- is what I end hy conceiving
it to mean"'. (Italics i.ilne)
Such is the conservative tone in which the article
is hegun. Yet hefore it in ended vie find these passages: "It
seems ohvioiM that 'the praj:.iat ic account of all this routine of
phenomenal knowledge is accurate". fp.46Gj "The humanism, for
instance, which 1 see and try so hard to defend, is the complet-
1 This ^mragraph appears as a footnote.
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Gst truth attained from my Tooint of viev/ up to date". )p,472)
In a 3iipi)l ouien tary article , "Hiimanism and Trutli Once
I.Iore", puljlished a few months later in anwer to questions
prompted hy this one, the acceptancG of humanism is entirely
definite, .Ind here James finds t;„,j,\-. ^le has heen a/vooaulag the
doctrine for several years. He says, "I myself put forth on
several occasions a radically pragmatist account of knowledrre".
(Mind, V.14, p. 19 6) .bid again he remarks, "When^ follov;ing
Schiller and Dev;ey, I define the true as that which gives the
maximal combination of satisfaction "(p,196)
The Theory- of Truth in ' PraAmatism ' and The
"
HTleaning of Truth '
In 1907 v/hen he pi.hlished his hook "Pragmiatisra'\
James, as v;e all know, was willing to accept the new theory of
truth unreservedly. The hesitating on the margin, the mere
interpreting of other's vie\7s, are things of the past, From
1907 James' position tov;ard pragmatism as a truth-theory is un-
eqi'ivocal •
Throughout the hook, as I should like to point out,
James is using 'pragmatism' in t'.7o senses', and 'trutli' in two
senses, ''.^''o t-'-o ^-^c" i-i i" -^n of pragmatism he recognizes himself,
and points out clearly tiie difference between pragmatism as a
method for attaining clearness in our ideas and pragm^ttism as
a theory of l o truth or falsity of those ideas. But the two
meanings of 'truth' he does not distinguish, ^Ind it is here
that he differs from Dewey, as we shall presently see. He
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differed from Peirce on the question of the meaning of ragmati:.!
--as to v;heth.er it ooiild he develo;ped to include a doctrine of
tr^ith as ;7Jll as of clearneas. He differs from .De^^ey on the
question of Hrnth' — as to v/hether truth shall he used in hoth
of the tv7o specified senses or only in one of them.
The ;lmhiguity of ^Satisfaction ' . -- The douhle meaning of truth
in James* vrriting at this date may he indicated in this v/ay:
While truth is to he defined in terms of sat is faction,' what is
satisfaction? l^oes it mean th:it i am to ho satisfied o_f a cer-
tain ciuality in the idea, or that I am to satisfied h^ it?
In other v/ords, is the criterion of truth the fact that the idea
leads as it promised or is it the fact that its leading, v/hether
just as it oromised or not, ij , .'^iS irahle? VAiich, in short,
are xie to tahe as truth, -- fulfilled expectations or valuahle
results?
It is in failing to distinguish het^:,-een these t^-o t^^-t
Ja-es involves himself, 1 helieve, in most of his difficulties,
iil.
and it is^the recO:Tnition d explicit indication of this dif-
ference tnat ^ev-ey differentiates himself from Jamos • may
pass on to cite s-necific instances in v/hich Jar.'ies uses eacJi of
these criteria. ^e shall find, of course, that there are pas-
sages which or.: he intemretod as meaning either value or ful-
fillment, hut there are many in v;hich ti;e use of valve as a
criterion seems unmistakahle
.
The follow-^Vn": quotations may he instanced: ''If

theological vie\7s prove to liavo value for concroto life, thej
v.-ill be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of Toeing good for
so nuch. i^'or hov/ much more thej" are true, vail depend entire-
ly on their relation to the other truths that have also to ho
acknowledge d'\ if'or example, in so far a^he Absolute affords
comfort, it is not sterile; "it h:.s that amoiuit of value;
it performs a eoncreto function. I 'Tiyself ought to call the
Absolute true "in so far forth*, then; and I unhesitatingly
nor; do so", (p. 72
J
"On pragmatic principles, if the hypotr.esis of 'lod
v7orhs satisfactorily in the vjidest sense of the v;ord, it I'j true.
IIow whatever its residual difficulties may bo, experience shor/s
that it certainly does v/ork, -.'.nd that the problem is to build
ort and determine it so f-^.^t it v/ill combine t isf^'cto rily v'ith
all the other working truths". (299)
"The true is the name for whatever proves itself to
ho good in the \/..iy vf ^olief, .nd goo^.too, for definite, assign-
able reasons " . ( V 6
)
"Empiric
-".l psj^'chologists . -. . .hnve denied the sqtiI, save
as the nane for verifiable cohesions in our innor life. Tho;,
redescend into the stream of experience vri.th it, and cash it into
"poculiar
30 much sm^all-change value in the v^;/ of 'ideas' and their^ con-
nections with- each other. The soul is good or 't rue
'
for just
so much, but no more". (9£. it a. ics mine)
"oince almost any obiect may some day become teranorari-
ly im-:ortant, the advantage of having a stock of e::' ra truths, o
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ideas tliat shall be true of laeroly possible situations, is oId-
vious
. .
."^^lenevor such extra truths heconie practically relevant
to one o^-'-^- emergencies, it passes from cold 3torar;':e to do
v.'orlr in the v/orld ana our he lief in it gro-.vs active. Tou can
say of it tlien eitlier that 'it_ i3_ useful because it is true* or
that it i^ *tru^e_ because it is useful ' . Both these phrases
nean exL^ctl;, oa.ne tliiiir: Fxon this ,simx)le cue pragmatism
gets her general notion of truth as something essentially bound
u^; -'ith the way in v.'bio'-' o^-.o. ^-loi-noTit in our experience may lead
U3 to\7ard3 other moments \/].ich it
. ;ill be worth while to hsive be en-
led to » "rimarily, and on the conrAon-sense level, the truth
of a state of mir.^'^ tii'=> th function of a leading that is worth
while " . (204-205, it.Aa.ic;3 ;jiine)
"To 'agree* in the widest sense with resl ity can only
""'-n to hn "'uidod '-"^ifier s t ra i "''^ t rp to it or into it;". s^-rTov-'f'
-
ings , or to bo .)ut into such '..'orking t c\} cii v;ith it as to IivVi^vilo
.
either it or something connected with, it better* than if we dis-
agreed. Better e ither intellectual. ly or practicall y*. . . . .in^^
idea that helps us to doal, v/hether practically or ir-.t ellcctually
,
with either reality or its belongings, that doesnH entangle
our progress in frustrations, that fits, in f^ct, and adapts our
life to tlie reality's whole sol^tiiig, -..'ill . . .hold true of thi..
reality". (212-213)
"'The true', to pn.t it very briefly, _ only the ex-
pedient in the way of pur tii inning, j.ui ao the 'right' is the •
only expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost
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any fashion ; and expedient in the long. run and on the whole of
the course (2ZZ)
le ma 77 add a passa^-o v;ith the same hearing, from "The
Meaning of Truth", In this quotation Jaraes is retracting the
statement made in the University of Galifornia Address that irith-
c^it f'^Q future there is no cl i ffer?^":'!ce hotweon theism and material-
ism. I:e says; "o^ven if matter could do every outward thing that
G-od does, the idea of it would not work as satisfactorily, "because
the chief c^ll "or Qod on no clem men's --^art is for a hein<T ""h.o
'i '.1 in-'urdl^ rouo:;iiise them i.id judge thom syinjatiiet icail^ •
Lla ter disappoints t?iis craving of our ego, and so God remjoins
for most .men the truer hypotliesis, and indeed remains so for
'ofinite pragmatic reasons", (p. 189,note)
,
The contrast between 'intellectual' and 'practical' seems
to make his -position certain. If truth is tested hy practical
working's, "S coutragted \/ith lectual -rorhings, it cannot he
said to ho limited to fulfilled expectr..tion.
The statement that the soul is good or true shows the
same thing. rnlation of truth to extraneous values is hero
"beyond question. The other passages all hear more or loss ofe-
viously, in the same direction.
As Jaraes keeps restating his -position, there are many
o~ t'^o definiti;-ns that coul. interpretod to mean either
values or fulfillments, and even a few which seem to ref:)r to
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fulfilment alono. Tho tv70 follov/ing examples can be taken to
lean either;
Truth ^ in onr ideas ancl 'oGli:-fs means .t-;'.t ideas
(v/hich themselves are but parts ol' our experience) become true
just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory rela-
tion T/ith other ^arts ^ our experience, to summarize them and
get about among t]iera by conceptual short-cuts instead of follOTfing
the interminable succession of particular phenomena. My idea
upon -.-"'i-^h G-^n ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry
us prosperously from one part of our experience to any other
-oart, linking things satisfactorily, '.vorking securely, simplify-
ing;, saving labor, is true for just so much, true in so far
forth, true instrumentally" . ("o,58)
"A nev; opinion counts as true ju,-::t in proportion as
it .^'-ratifies the individual's desire to assimilate the novel in
his experience to his beliefs in stock. I must both lean on
old truth and gras'^ new fact; and its success... in doing this, is
a matter for individual appreciation. ^len old truth grows, then
by new truth's addition, it is for subjective reasons. V'e are
in the process and obey the reasons. The new idea is truest
which ^^erforms :-:^st felicitously its function of satisfying this
double urgency. It makes itself true, gets itself classed ^s
tr^-e, by the way it works." (p. 64)
But vie can turn from the;^e .o _i paragraph in which
truth soems to be limited to fulfilled expectations
alone;
"True ideas are those which we can assimilate, validate^
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Gorro'bor;ite , and verify, False ideas are those which we cannot
That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true
ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all
fnat truth is Irnovm as
"But \7liat do validation and verification themselves
pra.^n.nt ically mean? Tliey a Rain signify certain Toractical con-
sec^uencos of t]:e v.: rifled and validated loloa . . . .:-^ucy liead us,...
through the acts and other ideas v/hicjh they instigate, into or
up to, or tovj-ards, other parts of exrerience with v/hich v;e fed
all the wh ile . . .that the original ideas remain in agreement.
The connections and transitions come to us from point to point
3 being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. ''^his function
of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification".
(p-^.EOl-E ""^2 )
The Relation of Truth to Utility. It seems certain from the
forego in-^' t':-^_t Ja-'^s means^at least .t cert-^in times, to define
the true In terms of the valuable. 3ati,j.: otion he i:- I.j.^
as satisfaction b^; rather than satisfaction of. As we have
•'Ointec'" out, or:o m. - satisfied of the correctness of one's
idea without bGing 11 satisfied by it. This distinction
^ as been most clearly set forth by Boodin, in his discussion of
'Wliat pra-graatism .is not', in the following vrords: "The truth
satisfaction m.ay run counter to any moral or esthetic satisfac-
tion in the particular case. It may consist in the discovery
t]:at the "ri-^nd 'r^^ iv-iched had involved us in financial fail-
ure, t^^at ti.3 cture v/o jad bought .f rom the catalogue descrip-
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tion is anything but beautiful. But Tre are no lon^^er uricertain
as regards the truth. Our restlessne.^s , so far as that par-
ticular curiosity is concerned, has coitig to in end"."^
It is clear tlien, th-^t the discovery of truth is not
to "be identified v;ith a predominantly satisfactory state of mind
at the moment. Our state of mind ?,t the moment may have only
a grain of satisfaction, yot this is of so unicue a kind and so
entirely distinguishahle from the otjier contents of the mind that
it is perfectly, practicable a'3 a criterion. It is simply "the
cessation of the irritation o-" ^. doi.ht", as Peirce puts it, or
tliG feeling that my idea has led as it promised. Ti e feeling of
fulfilled .zpcctation is thns a very distinct and recognisable
part of the whole oral feeling comi.'ionly described as "satis-
faction'. Wcien "utility' in our ideas, therefore, means a.
momentary feelinp- of dominant satisfaction, truth cannot be iden-
t ified v/ith it
.
And neither, as i wish nor/ "to point out, can truth be
ider^tlfied '.vith utility when utilit" '^eans a long-run satisfac-
torinoas, or satisfactoriness of t.iiu iuea for ^ '.;onsiderable
number of people through a considerable period of time. The
same ob,1ection "rrines hore ;?hich we noted a mo--"o t "'go -- f^at
.he Gatisfr.ctiOii a.-.y bo .^uito indiffer nt to " o .-Gcial oat l^-
faction a'rising from tests. As has been often shovm, many ideas
re satisfactory for a long period of time simoly because they . .n
1 "^.oodin: Truth and Reality, pp 19S-4.
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not siibiGcted to tests. "A hope '.o ^..o . ....jjo, _t i.^ .
fear, once either is reco-;:nized as unfo uncled .... 1 delusion is
delusion only so long as it is not .n to he one. A mistake car
^ built U'-ion only so long ^s it is not suspected".
Some actual delusions which v/ere not readily suhjected
to tests -have heen long useful in this vra^r, '^For iristanoe,
b :sinj ourselVv;;.: Lafcadio Fearn, jair,x-i i^^i'iz^
opinions summed up under the title * Anc est or-T7orship* had been
...'exactly w'~at rras reou.ired' by the former inh'-\bitants of
Japan" . "It '^-r- primitiv e: ' o " that -
ancestors required to ho fed and honored ... .beca;.se it induced
sav^-^es to bring up their offspring instead of lettin^^ it norish.
^ut al'!-"- "h it v/as useful to hold that opinion, t'lc L ' us
false". "I.IiiL: nd has always wanted, perhaps always required,
.md certainly nvido itself, a stock of delusions and so--hisms" ."^
Peri ,.\ -Tould all agree ^^iiof ::• '^o^
is on our side* has been useful tribe holding it. It
has increased seal "^nd fi^-~ ' :-ionciT trerriondoiisly . But
;jince '^oC. o u " ' ' ^'^c - -
conflict i;: ^ , atter hovr useful.. To believe that
(benefici'-l) trihol customs are enforced by the tribal gods is
•'•eful, ' " vi.-Gsisto-pt f-n '^olief is
false. The beautiful i i.xginings of poets are s ometifiies useful
in '-^ini-^i^.ing "^^nd dis^r^'^-si^S "^'^^ hs.vd and ugl:,-^ re-nj.ty, h^^t -rhen
they .."ill not test out they cannoi be said bcca .„ ui.eij.' ' oauty
1 Lee: Vital Lies, vol.1, . 11,^1,35,72.

or desirability to ^-^n truo.
^.Te liiuGt Goiiclude then, that 30f^e delusl' re usefr-l.
But
-re may go on James' identification of trut'
^'^ i''. 'ron a":'^"'
'
')Oint o-'' virv,7, in.stead of agreeing that
trno ideas and usefiil ideas arc the same, \jo juwo shovm that som
useful ideas are false: ' converse is also demonstrable,
"^'-t f?-^'-^-^ ^.^y-r-^ i'"-:'.;; r-:;elu^>..
^hertj are lormuals in pure science, whic^ ? use
to anyone :"de the science "becarse f^e^'r practical "boaririTj
such thoro , *L.j,Vvi ..ox ^ o t "booii .ui^uu and ar ' ,v
usG to the scientis ' 1 because, themselves the products
of dedrction, they as yet suggest riothinfr th^t can he "developed
xc^r'o .I'd!' xx'Oa. X--0-ii« i.l© tho " j i;. ulwiis laay xav
ful in either of these senses — for ^practical demands' out-
si''''.c the seleiice, or :is a ^^•leans to sonething else the
science — they ar true .uite apart from utility,
beca^'ne they v-ill test out by fulfilling expectations.
T&iowledp'e t' "^t useful is pont striking in rela-
L
' / Ice ' . ^ ' " - . -'J
cheat, nay knc t cheat inr . . ^^one , and yet in-
volve both himself and of ers in :^.ost unsatisfactory consenuence
"he ^-erjc ' ^t-ep '"'l- liquor,
to t' Is r;rl has located in a 'dry' district, may receive correct
info rTiation as to the location of a 'blind-tiger' — information
which while true aay brh " mv^ l.ij ...ovaifall. Knowledge
about any form of vice, true knov/led '.t can be tested out.
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m-^y r.-'O'T cj easier; "bo harmful to any e""'--^'nt -re like.
./e maw coiiolude this section by citing a x-^.'iragraph v/hieh
:ill show the fallacious reasoning by which James came :.denti-
fy the truth anc! the utility o:^ ic?eaG. It one Moint in rejjl^i..
to a criticism ho saj-s : "I can conceive no other objective con -
tent to the notion of an ideally perfect truth than that of
penetri^t 0-^ i-r'-o t-' co-^'^-ol -:tr^'! t-:-! tor-;inu3, can
I conceive 'o.::xz the notion Id ever have grovai up,, or ti .-.t
true ideas v^oiild ever have been sorted out from false or idle
^rt^s
,
- . great'"-" ^iT, c^^ r:--' t •.':f-ctions
,
intellectual
or practical, --iich the truer ones brou{mt with them.
nagine a man absolutely satisfied with an idea and with all ] :
relations to liis other ideas r"/"'- ^'-^ 'his sensibl^' - -^-r-' ^•icos , trho
should yet not take its content as a true account oi reality?
The matter of the true is thus absolutely identical vrith the
-.ttor ' '-i-'ti^-f'-- • tory. You . either word first in
your way of talking; but le.ive out that \'/hole notion of satis-
factory workinr; or learing (which is the essence of my pragmatic
iccount) and call tr^ \ r'- . : c
,
logical relation, independent
ever of T)0ssible leadings or satisfactions, and it seems to me
tKat you cut all ground from under you.". (Meaning of Tiuth,
p. 160) ^
1 It is interesting to see tluit Peirce had the foll^owing comment
to make in 1878 upon the utility of trath. "Logicality in re-
gard to practical matters is the most useful quality an animal
can Tjossess, and might, therefore, result from the action of
natural selection; but outside of these it is probably of mor::
advantage to the animal to have his mind filled Y/ith pleasing
^nd encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thr''
upon impractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a
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ITov; it ic to be olDserved that this paragraph contains
at lenst threo logical fallacies. In the first sentence there
is a false aGSUjnptio.i, namely that 'all survives is valuahle'.
'i'hen*, Y/e are given to understand, 'since true ideas survive,
thoy must "be valuable*. l:o biologist would an:j?ee to this major
premise, 'Correlation' preserves many tT'-'-'jj . -^^-^ not
vaUiable, as also do other factors.
In the second sentence t]iere is an implied false con-
version. T'he second sentence sj.ya , in 3 u'jbtance , that all true
ideas are satisfactory (valuable). This is supposed to prove
the assertion of the firct sentence, namely, that all satisfa.-
tory (valuable) ideas are true.
In the last sentence there is a false disjunction.
Truth, it is stated, must either be satisfactory (valuable)
v/orhing, or a static logical relation. "'"e have tried to sho
that it may sim.ply mean reliable vjorking or working that leads as
it promise^'. Tbis may bo neither predominantly valuable v:orking
nor a static logical relation.
'nie Relation of 3at iafaction to -ii;reo-i3:xt 'Jo^.u Istency .
--
James continually reasserts that he has 'remained an epistemo-
lo':"cal realist', that he has 'always postulated an independent
reality', th:rb ideas to be true must 'agree with reality*, etc.^
{note continued from 50) fallacious tendency of thoup'ht".
(T^^rom tbe first article in the series "Illustrations of the
logic of Science", Popular Science lionthly, vol.12 ,p. o)
1 Jj^or example, in t e Meanin;- of Truth, pages 195 and 233.

Reality ho definos most cloarly :iG follov/s:
Reality^ iii general v/liat truths have to take
account of
"T'jie firnt ^ -^.rt of reality fro.'^ thic point of viev/ is
the flux of our SGiicatio.iLj . 'Jensat ai-e ici-uuC upon us. . .Over
t:ieir nature, order and quantity v;e have as good as no control....
"The second part of reality, as something that our l^e-
liefs must also take account of, is the relations that ohtain he-
tween tlieir copies in our minds. This ^art falls into tv70 suh-
irts : 1) the relations th^t, -r- mutahle --^.^^ accidental, as
those of date and place; -md 'c) those th-t are fixed and essential
hecause they a:. e grounded on the inner nature of their teniis.
Toth sorts of relation are matters of immediate perception.
Both are 'f->cts'
"The third part of reality, additional to these per-
ce-:>tions ftho largely haser p on them), is the previous truths
of which every new incaiiry takes account". (Pragmatism, p. 244)
ill! idea's agreement with reality, or hotter v;ith all
thoso v^rts of reality, means a satisfactory relation of the
idea to them, Relation to the sensatinnal part of reality is
foujid satisfactory when the idea leads to it without jar or
discord. "... .iTliat do the words verification and valiihation
themselves pragmatically mean? The;>. again signify certain
ractical conseouences of the verified and validated idea. It
is hard to find any one phrase that characterizes these conse-
c uences hotter thr.n the ordinary agreement-formula -- iust such
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consequences being what ive have in mind when v/e say that our
ideas *agrce* v/ith reality, -h-ey lead us, namely, through the
act?::; and other ideas -jhich thoy instigate, into and up to, or
towards, other parts of experience v/ith v^'hich we feel all the
while ...that the original ideas remain in agreement. The con-
nections and transitions come to us from point to point as hein
progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agree
ahle leading is what v/e mean "by an idea's verification". (Prag-
matism, -op. 201-2)
.^In idea's relation to ohu other p'.^rts cf reality is
conceived more "broadly. Thus pragmatism's "only test of proha
hie truth is wriat v/orlis host in the v/ay of loading us, what fit
every -:^art of life host and comhines witli collectivity of
life's demands, nothing "being omitted. If theological idea
should do this, if the notion of ^od, in particular, should
prove to do it, how could pra.^.rK'.tiSui ,.)0ssi"ble deny God's exis-
tence? jhe corld see no meaning in treating as 'not true' a
notion that v/as pragmatically so successful. W" at other kind
of truth could there he, for lier, than a.lI this agreement with
concrete reality "? (Pragmatism, p»80, italics mine). Agree-
ment v/ith reality here means ability to satisfy the sum of life
emands
.
James considers that this leaves little room for li-
cence in the choice of our beliefs. "Between the coercions of
the sensible order those o_ ideal order, ouv •. is
thus wedged tightly". "Our (a.iy) theory must mediate belr.veen
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ill previous truths and certain neiv e:i erienoes. It muot de-
range Goranon sonsG and previous iDGlief ao little as T)OssilDle,
and it must lead to some sensi'olo teiminus or othnr t-at cfin "be
verified exactly;. To 'work' means "both these things; and the
squeeze r?. so ti":-ht that there is little loose play for any hypoth
-esis. Our theories are thus wedged and controlled as nothing
else is". "Pent in, as the pragrnatist more th.n.n anyone else
sees himself to he, het\7cen the v/holo "body of funded truths
squeezed from tho v-^t ""'^ ^ coercions of the world of sense
ahout him, ',7ho so well as he feels tho immense pressure of oh-
-"octive control under vrhioh our minds perform their operations'*.
(Irarmatism, pa. 211,317,222.)
ITow on t - G contrary it immediately occurs to a reader
that if reality he simply "what truths have to tahe account of",
and if taking-account-of merely mc^ns agreeing in such ' - as
to satisfy "tho collectivity of life's demands", then the pro-
pcjrtion in w^^ich thc-G parts of reality will count will vary
enormously. One person may find the 'previous-truths' a".rt of
reality to make such a strong 'demand* that he will disregard
•principles' or reasc al^iont eatirol".
\nother may disregard the ' dcnucaL- i . xi. a ' at of reality, and
give no consideration whatever to 'scia.tific' results. These
things, in fact, an exactly t]-:.a-:-s that do take o.
The opinionated person, the crank, t....o fana"^ ic, as well
merely pre ;iud iced, all refuse to open their minds and give any
particular consideration to such kinds of evidence. There is
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th-erefore a great deal of room for lioe,,.ico, i.nd a great deal of
liGG:ice x^racticed, when the afrreement of our ideas reality
me.uLo nothing more th''Mi theii iafactoriness to our lives* de-
mands.
Eo\7 James fell into this error is sho?m, 1 "oclleve,
")y his overestim'^tion of the common man's regard for truth
^
\nd es-oeciall3^ for consistency. Thus he remarks: -jq hu-
mans a G constituted in point of fact, Yre find that to believe
in other men's minds, in independent physical realities, in past
e^,^entG, in eternal logical relations, is satisfac oux^ . . . .Ahove
all 'no finr"^ feonsistency satisfactory, consistency "botv/oen the
-rGSuL'it idea " -' lie entire rest of our i..;c,.tal equipment
'Mfter man^s interest in hreathing freely, the greatest of all
"is interests Cbecause it never fluctuates or remits, as most
of his physical interests do), is ^vi - '-^terest in consistenc y,
in feeling t?iat what he now thi ' :oes v/ith what he thinks on
other occasions". (Meaning of Truth, p p. 192, £11)
The general method of James on this point, then, is
to define truth in is of satisfaction ar-'' t^-- - to try to show
that th.es satisfactions cannot he secure:! ill0;3'itimately
.
That is, that we must defer to eiroerimental findings, to consis-
tency, and to other checks on opinion. Consistency m.ust he sat-
isfactory hecanse people are so constitiited as to find it so.
Agreement with reality, where reality means epistemological
reality, is satisfoctory ^ - t- - sa-o reason. \nd agreement
-I
'
" reality where reality inciiiu.es in addition principi^es and
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previouG truths muat "be satisfactory iDGcar^se agreement in this
Ga,:o orely means such taking-acc ount-of as -.Till satisfy the
greater prooortion of the denands of life. In other words, hy
defining agreement in this Ga:ie in terms of satisfactions, he
malres it oert-^in that agreement and satisfaction v/ill coincide
hy thG device Oo. arguing in a circle. It turns out that, from
over-anxiety to assure the coincidence of agreement and satis-
:^action, he rntlrely loses the possihility of using reality and
agreement with reality in the usual senGo of chec:-.d on sat is
-
f-actions
.

CHATTEH III
TIIE PMGLIATIG DOOTRILTS A3 33T FORTH BY DlilV/EY
The position of Dewey is best represented in his
paper called '^The lisperimontal Theory of ISiovrledge" ."^ In the
method of presentation , this article is much like Jarnes ' ac-
count ^Tiie Function of Cognition". Both assiijne some simple
type of consciousness and study it^^radually introducing more
and more complexity. In aim, also, the tv/o are similar, for
the purpose of each is siraidy to descrihe. Dewey attempts here
to tell of a knowing just as one describes any other object, cotl-
corn, or event. "What vie wan'j", he t:Lrinounces "is just something
vmich takes itself for knowledge, rightly or v/rongly".
Let us suppose, then, that we ha^'e sim .ly a floating
odor. If this odor starts changes that end in )iGking and en-
joying a rose, what sort of changes must these be to involve some
w'here v/ithin their course that T/hich we call Imowledge?
ilow it can be shown, first, that there is a difference
be1r\7een Imowir^ ^.-nd. mors i-resence in consciousness. If the smell
is simply displaced by a felt movement, and this in turn is
displaced by the enjoyment of the rose, in such a way that there
is no experience of connection bet-.-een t>e throe stages of the
process, - that is, without the appearance oi :.iemory or antici-
1 Hind IT. 3. IB, July 1906. Reprinted in "The Influence of Dar-
win on Philosophy and Other Essays" .p .77 . Page references arc
to the latter.
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pation, - tlien ''siiCii an ezcpGrienoe neitlier is, in v;hole or in
part, a Imo^-Tledge" . "Acciuaintance is presence honored by an
escort; presence is introduced as familiar, or an association
sprivi,o;s up to greet it. ilcq.uaintance always implies a little
friendliness; a trace of re-lmowing, of anticipatory '.-elcorae
or dread of the trait to follov/ . . .To be a smell for anything
else) is one thing, to be known as a smell, another; to be a
'feeling' is one thing, to be knOT7n as a 'feeling' is another.
T^rn firnt Is tjiinghood; existence indubitable, direct; in t]iis
v/ay all thir:;-:^^ are that are in 'consciousness' at all. The
second is reflected being, things indicating and calling for
other things - something offering the possibility of truth and
:;ence of falsity. '"'he first is genuine immediacy; t second
( in V.\Q instance discussed) a pseudo-immediacy, v;]iich in the
same breath that it proclaims its irrmediacy smuggles in another
tnrm ( ^md one -.Thic'^ t ^rm orienceo both in itsel:^ Its
relation) the sub^ject of 'consciousness', to v'hich the iirane-
diate is related ... .To be acquainted iTith a thing is to be
assured (from the standpoint of the experience itself) that
it is of such and such a character; that it v;-ill behave, if
given an opportiuiity, in such and such a v/ay; that the obviously-
and flagrantly present trait is aosociated with fellov/ traits
that will shov; themselves if the leading of the present trait
is followed out. To be accfuaintea is to anticipate to some
extent, on Lhe basis of previous ex,yer ienee" . (pp. 81, 02)
Besides mere existence, there is another type of

Gxperienoe \7hich is often oonfusod \7ith knowledge, - a type
•..'Iiloh De\7oy calls the 'cognitive' as ^ nti--ct fr--- genuine
knowledge or tlio * cognitional ' . In tiiis experieiice "we retro-
spectiveljT" attrilnite intellectual force and function to the
dT.Gll". ^'ils involves memory hut not ant ici oation. As we
look hack from the enjoyment of the rose, we can say that in a
sense the odor meant the rose, even though it led us here
hlindly. That is, if the odor suggests the finding of its
cause, without specifying what the cause is, and if we tlien
search ahout ano find the rose, we can say that the odor meant
tl-^e rose in the sense that it actually led to the discovery of
it. "Yet the smell was not cognitional because it did not
knov/ingly intend to mean this, hut is found, after the event, to
havo meant it". (^.^41
Icow, ""before the catagory of confirmation or refuta-
tion can, he introduced, there must he" something which means to
mean something". let us therefore introduce a further co:.i-
lexityinto the illustration. Let us suppose that the smell
quale occurs at a later date, and is then "av/are of something
else which it means , whicli In-!- -nds to effect h^- an o -aera-
tion incited hy it o.nd without vmioh its own presence is ahor-
;ive, and, so to say, unjustified, senseless". Here we have
something "'-^hioh co 'to-r-ioraneously' av/are of meaning some-
thing heyond itsolf , instead of having this meaning ascribed
to it hy another -at a later period. The odor knows the rose ,
the rose is knovm hy the odor, and the ir-ort of each term is
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constituted the relationship in which it stands to the other".
fp,88) This is the remn'. e ^cognitional' e:^;^orioncG
.
When the odoi- rocurs * cognitinnally ' , hatlj. uLio odor .an
"'
the rose are present in the same experience, though hoth are
not -oro'^ent in the same way. "Things can "be presented as ah--
3on'.
,
just as thoy can og presented as hard or soft". The en-
;joyraent of the rose is present as going to 'be there in the same
way V.-^-t t'-'G o(''. or is. "Tho situation is inherentl^r an uneasy
one - ono in \;iiich everything hangs upon the peri'o rriUnce of the
operation indicated; upon the adequacy of movement as a con-
necting link, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and the thin'!
meant. Generalizing from this ipistance, -:o get the fol'. -^n'.ng
definition: .In exoerience is a knowledge, if in its q^uale there ii
an experienced distinction '-^rxi. connection of tv.-o clonents of
tile fo 11 owi sort: ono means or intends the-presenco .c
other in the same fashion in vrliich it itself is /e-
Sft"t, wi^ile the of- or is t'-^t; -^hich, while not present in the
Gauie fashion, must beco 3 oat if the meaning or intention of
its Goi^panion or yoke-fellow is to he fulfilled through the
operation it sets up". ( p.90)
How in the transformation from t'is tensional situation
into a h-.rrnonious -situation, thero is an exy^erience either of
fulfilment or isa-opointrnent . ore is a disappointment of
expectation, this may. throw one Ixioli in rofioo i-jluu upon the
original situation. The smell, • may say, seemed to mean a-
rose, -^ct i"": d ji-^t in -^'-ct lead to a rose. There is something
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Glse vrhich enters in. ^^e then bepin an invest ig'^.t ion
•
"Smell,.: "-oGoro t-.-; oloieot of knowledge. l'lic\, - ' S..c
,
jro tempore , the plac6 which the rose fomerly occupied. One
mi"^" th^'t IS. ohserve the oanes in r/hich t?ie odors mean other
xjij-iitAa jubu rose,-,, i-i.ij voiL-x-\, .,^-11^ x-rodrce new cases for
the salco of further inspection; and thus account for the cases
,,rh:-re meanin.gs had heen falsified in the insue; discriminate
:nore carefully the peculiarities of those .aoaiilngs v/hich t..-
eventverified , ^ t^ms safeguard and hulwark to some e:>:tent
t'-o employing of similar meanings in the future." (p. 93)
..].on v/e reflect u^on these fulfilments or refusals, we find in
:-.hem a quality ",uite lacking to them in their immediate oc-
cnrance iust fulfilments 'yncl disappointments", - the quality
o:" affording assurance and correction. "Tnitli ..xxd falsit;/
ire not properties of any experience or thing, in and of itself
or in its first intention; hut of things ?/here the prohlom of
...CO uo.isciously i... falsity pre--^ ^-^
themselves as significant f:-'cts only in situations in which
soecific moanin"'3 :Mid their already experienced fulfilments and
non-fulfilments • intentionally co - .'.rcf^ -n^^ c r.^tr-.-to-' with
reference to the ;„^uestion of the worth, as to tiie reliability
of meaning, of the given meaning or class of meanings. Like
knowledt;e itself, trutli io an experienced relation ff-i-r--,
and it has .no meaning outside of such relation", (p 95)
Though this pa^^er is hy title a discussion of a theory
of knowledge, we may find. i.. ohi. aragraph a very clear
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relating of the whole to a theory of truth. If v/o atterui^c \.o
lifferenti-ite in this article betY/een knovj-ledge and truth, we
find f .0 Jhile He' 'ey uses 'Imowledge' to refer either to the
prospective or to the retrospective end of the experimental
e-oerience, he evidently intends to limit truth to the retro-
u -.^ctive or confirmatory end of the experience. Tnen he sajB
,
''Truth and falsity are not properties of any experience or thin:
in and of itself or in its first intention ,- but of things
v/herc the problem of -.issur'-ince cox.Gciously enters in. Truth and
falsity present themselves as significant facts only in situations
in v/hich soeoific meanings and th-eir already experienced fulfit
lents a:. entionally co'-^ -'n.rDr' and contrasted T:ith reference
to the (iuestion of the worth, ,.v3 to reliability of meaning,
of the given meoning or class of meanings'', it seems that truth
is to b:: confined to retrospective e:- 'erience. The truth of an
idea means that it allows one at its fulfiLiient to look back
at its former me-nir.g and think of it as now confirmed. The
difference betxreen knowledge an^ tr^^th is the:i a difference in
the ti-e at which the developing e;::^jrience is exar^ined. If
one takes the experience at the appearance of the knwing odor,
he gets acquaintance.; if one takes it at the sta-e at -hichlt
has developed into a confirmation, he gets truth. laiov/iou-o
ma^r be either stage of the exoerience of verification, but
truth is confined later, confirna- ory , stage.
Truth, then, is .simply a matter of confirmation of
T^rediction or of fulfilment of expectation. An idea is made
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true "by ^.eaiing as it T.a-omised, ilnd an idea is moAo false when
it leads to refiitn.tion of expectation. There seems to "be no
necessity here for an ahsolute reality for the ideas to conform
to, or ^correspond* to, for truth is a cert lin kind of relation
"betv/een the ideas themselves - the relation, namely, of leading
to fulf ilnjent of expectations .
Oont rast Betv/een James and Dev^ey
If, noV?;, v/e wish to hffing out the difference hetv/een
the account of truth which we have just examined and the ac-
count that is given by Jojnes, we shall find the distinction
cxuite evident, 'Truth, for Dewey, is that relation vrfiich arises
when, at an exioeriencc of fulfilment, one looks hack to the
former experience and thinks of its leading as now confirmed.
In idea is true, therefore, when wo can ref.Tr "back to it 'in
this v/ay aiid say, "Tliat pointing led me to this experience, as
it said it would". The pointing, by "bringing a fulfilment , is
made true - at this point of confirmation it "becomes true.
Since a true idea is defined, then, as one v/hich leads
as it promised, it is obvious that truth will not be concerned
in any way V7ith incidental or accidental values which mifrht be
led to by t'::^- iuea. It has no relation to v.-hether tlic ^oslI
""0 3:t]i while being led to or not. James speaks of truth as a
leading that is worth vrhile. For Dev/ey the goal maj^ be valuable,
useless, or even piernioious , these are ontirely irrelevant
to tnith, which is determined solely by the fac^j that the idea
leads as it promised
.

-64-
The existence of this distinction was xoointecl out,
»
after the -i;-^pe-irn.nGe of James* •'Pragmatism", l3y "De'Tcy himself.
Vfter careful diacuG^ion of some other points of difference,
he says of this matter of the place of the value of an idea in
reference to its truth: "7Ie have the theory f '-'t ideas as ideas
ire al\7ays v/orking hypotheses concerning att^i... mg particular
empirical resiilts, and are tentative programs for sketches of
method) f'^r attaining them. If v;e stick consistently to this
notion of ideas, only consequences v/hich are actually produced oy
the working of tho idea in coo^oeration with, or arplication to,
prior realities ore good consequences in the sx^ecific sense of
good \7hich iG rclov tnt to establishing the truth of an idea.
This is, at time, unecLuivocally recognised hy !.!r. James ....But
other times an;- good that flows from acceptance of a belief
is treated as if it were .an evidence, in 3d_ far, of the truth of
the iden, , This holds particularly when theological notions
• for consideration. light woT^ld be thrown upon how V.t.
James conceives tliis matter by statements from him on ::,a^i poixxu^
'\3 these: If ideas terminate in good bonsequences , but yet the
goodnoGf"! of the consecuence vras no part c ntion of the
idea, does tho goodness i.avo u,ny verifying force? If the good-
ness of consequences arises from the context of the idea rather
than from the idea irself , does it have any verifying force?
1 '^Wliat Does. Pragmatism Mean by Practical?", Jorrnal of Philoso-
phy, etc., 190':, v. 5, p. 85.
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If ail idea leads to conseciuences which are good in the one re-
spect only of fulfilling the intent of t]ie idea, fas v/hen one
drinks a liq.uid to to.. ^ i'o"' that it ; poison), does the
badness of t]ie consequences in every other respect detract from
\:]ie verifsring force of these consequences?
'3inee j' r. Ja;aoi2 haj rofurrred to »;w aj oaying 'truth
is what gives satisfaction' (p,2S4), I may remark. . .That I never
Identified any satisfaction with the tn^th of en idea, save tha^
satisfacti-v •--ich arises when the idea .... vrorking hypothesis
or ' wive method is applied to prior existences in such a
., julfil what it i t
"
.hwu li^ jays. . .of uhu iu. . ... osolut ,. , V. ..
IS it jiifords such comfort it surcl-y is not sterile. It ]-'is
amount of value; it performs a concrete function. \ 'uoC.
•
: iti st I ought to call oi-G auoOlutu true in jJo_ -au.- j..'c.^ th then
I unhesitatingly now do so ' , the doctrine seems to be un-
ambiguous: that an^ S^'^^i consequent upon acce-otance of ' jf
,
is, in so far forth, ,.„i...,mt fo: truth. Of go '^rse !tr. Ja-:!03
holds that this *in so far' goes a vur^ small w...ty . . . .But even -tne
slightest concession, is, I thinlc, aon-pragmatic unless the
satisiact i.n is relevant to the idefea as intent. Novr the satis-
faction in .:j_uestio.. . .:e3 not frca the idea as idee. , J from
its acceptance as true. Gan a satisfaction dependent upon an
ass^-mption that an idea is already true be relevant to testing
u.,.. .ruth of -Uid c- ^ly^^ t"'.at oi . Szo-
lute, -,.'hich, if true, 'absolutely' precludes any appeal to
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50 conseciueiicGS as test of truth, Tdg u. rirmeu j^. /'lo
^iraonirit'ic test T7ithout sheer self-oontradiction"?"^ 'Vm ex-
IDlioit statement as t - -' other the car^^ ..-^ ooion,the I-l-..^^...^
of thl" f's, is satisfaouc. / and prosperous and hence true in so
f . t executes the intent of the idea; or whether the satis-
faction and prosioerity reside in the material consequences on
.'ir O'.Tii .iccount and in that as/ject make the Idea, true, vrould,
T ,m sure, locate the point at issue and economise and fructify
future discussion. At procer.t pra'^:raatism is accepted 'by those
v/h03o ./u ...ii' ohorou'"hly ratio.. ..miotic in Liaho-.-p
means of refurhishing, galvanizing, and justifying those vory
iOtioTis. It is rojocted "by non-rationalists (empiricists
'vr ', '..uic ide::I.ijts) because i ojc.i^ L.l^
the notion that pragmatism holds that t'ne desirability of cer-
tain bel-''-"' r---^-'-rides the question of tl: . ' thn i^^oa
involved Li. ;nd the e:>'istence of objects de.,.^^u>.
Others (like myself) wjio believe thoroughly in pragmatism as
a metho- of orientation as defined by Mr. James, and v/ho would
apply the inGtiiOv' oo the dotCx.^iiia ciOxi of -oao i.i^j/^iL^i^ of objects,
V c Intent and worth of ideas as ideas, and to tlio h- man and
raoral v'^l-f^ o-^ boliefs, when these problems are carefully dis-
tia:-:i3huu. ^'xo... Ouo ...oo-o^', -t kntjw whether are prag-
matists or not, because they are not sure whether the 'practical
in the sense of the desirable facts which define the worth of a
1 The last four sentences appear in a footnote.
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jelier, is confn.sed \7lth. the practia- 1 as an attitude imposed
by olDjGG-bo, ^-nC. with the ^^xo-o:' ' ... ^ and function of
idea to effect changes in i^rior existences • Hence the impor-
uar.ce of Imov/in' pi\a{?matism means hy practical....
''I ,70 -.Id cic ' ' - J.n injusfoc, however, v
-
here, His real doctrine, I ..liink, is thao a holief is true
„.-;.o:.. It satisfies hoth the -'crsonal needs and the requirements
0-^ objective thiii-s . ^ ' ' of -ira^atism, he sa^/ s , 'Her'
only test of probable truth is v/hat \7orks best in the way of
leadin.^ us, what fits every part of life best and combines vath
t/,c collectivity of e:: ^^eriences d emands , nothin.^ hein- omitted'.
And a.^ain, 'That new idea is truest which performs most feli-
citously its function of satisfying our double urgency ', (p. 64)
It does not appear certain from the context t'lat tlvis 'double
urgency' is t'vit of the personal and the objective demands, but ii:
is probable... On this basis, the 'in so far forth' of the truth
of the absolute because of the comfort it suoplies, moans that
one of th,: tvjo conditions which need to be satisfied has been
met, so that if the absolute met the other one also it would be
QPito true. I b -,io doubt thatth1<? is ?^r. Ja-^es' meaning, anc.
it sufficiently safeguards hh.i frora charges thao piugmatism means
that anything that ' is agreeable is true. At the same time,
I do not thin]:, in logical strictness, that satisfying one of
two tests, V7hen satisfaction of hoth is requixecl, can be said to
co^:i-titute a belief true even 'in so far forth'.

7rit:Liig as a soicntist and pulDlishing his v/ork in a
SGientifio journal, Peiroe ^^ro-^^n.-^G'" in 1878 a n'T" mcf^od for
malving our ideas clear. He v; ue.ipuing a u>joCi i^j uion of
tjie logie of the sciences. He Ijcliex^ed himself to he shovdng
hoT7 the greatest of our modern thinkers do ma]:e clear to them-
3elYes their ideas of the ohjects v/ith Yjhioh they work. The
meaning of anything, said Peirce, consists in the actual or
;;03Sihle effects v/hich it might produce. Our idea of the thing
is clear when v/e have in mind these ueixdible effects, Tliis
theory of clearness he called pragmatism.
ITo one, it seems, paid any especial attention to this
theor:y at the time. But t-.ven-'.y years later Jarnes "brought the
suhject to the forefront of a discussion hy explaining it anev/
in his exceptionally lucid \7ay and hy making particular ar^pli-
cation of it to religion. But for James the method for clear-
ness very soon grew into a new theory of truth, and in this \7ay,
in sy)ito of t:^Te f.^o't that tlie method had hcen proposed "by a
scientist as a desciption of the procediL.c of sci.-^nco, he seems
to have lost for it the support of science. The reason for
this outcome was hid introduction of value as a criterion for
trutli. This, James recognises, v/as counter to all the scien-
tific ideals of many of the workers in science, for the essence
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of thoir roeedure, as they sav; it, v/:i.g to ;-ut all desires as
to outcomes 'behind them and t try to find out hovr things ac-
tually prove or test out to he, quite apart fron o.; ,;o vroiild
like tr.em to oe. To introduce the general value of an outcome,
then, as a criterion for tzTith, seems to destroy vrtiat the scien-
tist had oeen thinking of as 'pure research' , ^.n^^^ to involve
control by an outside influence that v/ould determine ?/hich things
are or are not valuable and worth investigating. It was suf-
ficiently well Ihiown to the scientist that m-ost of the great-
est scientific discoveries v/ere made by men \Yho had no appre-
ciation or interest in the general utility of the outcome, and
\7h03e results were ajvolied only much lau^r :j,nd , as it were, by
accident. To say, then, that the truth of an idea v,ras influ-
enced by its general value was to run afoul of all the sorely
sensitive ide-'.ls which the scientist had acquired in his recent
contest with the domination of the church. It is hardly to be
v;ondered at, therefore, that the inuorpretat ion of pragmatism
given by Janes was not popular with persons of a scient'.fic
temperament.
rurthor, ix the value or desirabLity of an idea has
an influence u.-^on :.ts truth, then truth v/ill vary from person
to Tierson, for desirability varies with the taste of the person
concerned. Poirco h,...: warned against individual standards of
truth in his discussion of the Methods of Fixing Belief.
The scientific conception, as it had differenciat ed itself from
ot;iGr conceptions of tiiith, had attempted to secure a kind of
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truth not determined "by what we v/oiild like or by what can he
inado to seem desir^.hle by oratory or by what can be made to
win out over otlier ox-)i>iions by skill in debate, but by some
criterion quite apart from desire and opinion. Peirco had at-
tempted such a criterion in ...ij ^jostulate of XLii^l:.j.u^i^x^ eter-
nal reality. Instead, that is, of consulting with each other,
of debating with each other to find the truth, -.le ought to con-
sult this reality. In ot^ior words, to undertake scientific
experiment. Such had been Peirce's description of the scien-
tific and modern method of attaining truth as contrasted, as he
says elso •-^^ -^-0 , -ith that of the medievalists.
l\fow the difficulty in Peirce's method, as we have seen,
\7as tliat this postulate of an external reality unaffected by
our opinions - -i/'' not endure the test for clearness. Every
object, says Peirce, reduces to the sum of its effects. The
only effect of real things, he says again, is to produce belief.
From these tv.ro propositions it -n^-'' "' follow that reality
is .1 sum of beliefs. But this, of course, eliminates any un-
chan'^lng reality independent of our opinions abort it.
^e !J ^ ' • further that Peirce def i"""-^;' '^oth belief and
meaning as hibi ' made no distinction betv.-cen them. Now as
belief anc" ing are obviously no same, we are in need
of no-." definitions -^-"^r "'"''ose torns.
At this point we turned to the interpretation of
Dewey. For Dc lie distinction would seorn to be that while
T2C :. ,,j11 be defi'ioc'. as h^.bit , '-^oliof is to be defined as

-71-
e:rpect;T,tion. If vre iDelieve in anything, this means that we
o:;_;;ect. certaiii x''j;rrLlts from it. To hell r- Id 'Lc
if •"3 ixe to come into relation with the thing we v/ould. find
certain effects to come aoo'-t.
it'rom this conception the Deweyan theory - of tnith v/ould
seem + '"' "''ollo^? i-omediately. If l^^.i".--^ -^^ans a siim of expecta-
tions, the tnith of a helief would mean the verification of these
esjpec tat ions • \ t:.-; • hr-'Vi-f qi—l- -.le^/.-^^ one that fulfils
e .roe c tations
•
The Deweyan devoloioment of tlie pragmatic method is
obviously very much more in harmony with the proceduie of
science than that of James, vcUiius seems to have *loft tl:o
track' in his interpretation of the pragmatic method v.-iien he
related truth to .
^
redominantly valuable. Truth we have
for-'"- "''^ no necessary or invar i " '"-V-^ c-'^ny", ection with general
value, for many ideas would he acknowlef, 0. he perfectly true
whilo at the sano timo hr;in>'^ cither useless or harmfu.l. For
"-"jj oui;j ...j.o-Lor 0.; .1^ :lace in 00 the test
of the truth 0:' ' for its truth means nothing more than
-^r-. o •'.5 1 . '0 " ', ".''O'^.iO GS •
',Vo sea.., oucii, it ..la^ he said in conclusion, to he
confronted with something like the following alternatives:
If -JQ heli^'^''^ f'-p-vt '^-^"'ey coul^i -lot have .nado 1 corroct
deduction from the pragi.iatic method when he developcc '.nto a
theory of tru.th making truth depend upon fulfilled expectations
alone, t--":^ very ohvio- sl;' t'^e next step in this investigation
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13 to find the point at which his inferences v/ent wrong. This
•jieans a re-e:caminat ion of each s"l ' i his reasonin •.
If ooll'^- ' "^o— :--oos maho - correct deduction
from the pragmatic method in this development tc " truth, then
vjQ are confronted with the alteriTiative of either acc. the
"Deweyan theory of truth or of rejectf., - -'-"z:? leircian theory of
clea.rneGS. That io, if we begin with Teirce on method, we
HUG t -then go clear throujjh to Dewey on truth. And if iie re-
ject Dewey, while iDolievins ' Peirce gave correct descrip-
tion of the method of science, then it seoiis that we must con-
clude tliat the method of science and the method of philosophy
'rre not the same.
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